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CONSCIOUSNESS OF WRONGDOING:
MENS REA IN ALASKA
BARRYJEFFREY STERN*
It is said to be a universal rule that an injury can amount to a
crime only when inflicted by intention - that conduct cannot be
criminal unless it is shown that one charged with criminal conduct
had an awareness or consciousness of some wrongdoing. 1
It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that ordinarily a
person cannot be convicted of a crime unless that person acts with a
certain level of intent.2 This intent requirement is frequently re-
ferred to as mens rea. 3 In the recently revised Alaska Criminal
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1. Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 78 (Alaska 1969) (citing Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
2. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952), the Supreme Court
explained the rule as follows:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted
by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose be-
tween good and evil.
(footnote omitted); see also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (" 'The
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.' ") (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 500 (1951))).
3. In Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342, 344 n.15 (Alaska 1969), the Alaska Supreme
Court, quoting from BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1137 (4th ed. 1951), defined Mens
rea as "'a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent."'
Professor Sayre has concluded that "[n]o problem of criminal law is of more
fundamental importance or has proved more baffling through the centuries than the
2 ALASKA L,4WREVIEW [Vol. 1:1
Code4 it is referred to as the culpable mental state requirement.5 In
Speidel v. State, 6 the Alaska Supreme Court, relying on Morissette v.
United States, 7 equated the mens rea requirement with the necessity
of establishing that the defendant acted with a "consciousness of
some ,wrongdoing."18 In subsequent cases, the Alaska Supreme
Court9 and the Alaska Court of Appeals l ° have struggled to clarify
and apply the consciousness of wrongdoing requirement.
This article will be divided into three parts. The first will trace
the judicial development of mens rea rules in Alaska with particular
emphasis on the problems that have arisen from the use of the
phrase consciousness of wrongdoing as a shorthand reference to the
mens rea requirement. The second part will survey several of the
most important culpable mental state rules in the criminal code with
determination of the precise mental element or mens rea necessary for crime ...
But when it comes to attaching a precise meaning to mens rea, courts and writers are
in hopeless disagreement." Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974, 974 (1932)
(footnotes omitted).
4. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 219 (effective Jan. 1,
1980) [hereinafter referred to as the criminal code].
5. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b) (1983) provides: "A person is not guilty of an
offense unless the person acts with a culpable mental state.. . ..." ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.81.900(b)(10) (1983) defines "culpable mental state" to mean "'intentionally,'
'knowingly,' 'recklessly,' or with 'criminal negligence,'" as those terms are defined
in ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a) (1983). See infra notes 231, 232 for the definitions
of "intentionally" and "knowingly" and infra text accompanying notes 256, 282 for
the definitions of "recklessly" and "criminal negligence."
Hereinafter, all references to the intent requirement of criminal statutes will be
made by the term mens rea except when the reference is to the intent requirement of
a crime included in the criminal code or when the context requires otherwise. Ref-
erences to the intent requirement of crimes in the criminal code will be made by
referring to the culpable mental state requirement unless the context requires
otherwise.
6. 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969).
7. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
8. Speidel, 460 P.2d at 78; see supra text accompanying note 1.
9. State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981); Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821
(Alaska 1980); Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P2d 25 (Alaska 1978); State v. Guest, 583
P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978); State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1975); Alex v.
State, 484 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1971).
Because of space limitations, Guest will not be examined in this article. In ad-
dition, Bell v. State, 668 P.2d 829 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), will not be discussed.
Both cases consider whether the defense of reasonable mistake as to age must be
recognized when criminal liability is dependent upon the victim being under a cer-
tain age. While Guest and Bell discuss the consciousness of wrongdoing require-
ment, both cases involve a relatively distinct and separable application of the
general principles examined in this article.
10. Langesater v. State, 668 P.2d 1359 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Bell v. State, 668
P.2d 829 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Gudjonnson v. State, 667 P.2d 1254 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1983); Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Reynolds v.
State, 655 P.2d 1313 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam).
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the objective of comparing the legislative and judicial approaches to
mens rea in key areas. The concluding section will recommend
abandonment of the use of the phrase consciousness of wrongdoing
and propose an alternative formulation of the mens rea requirement.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF MENS RE4 REQUIREMENTS
The Alaska appellate courts have been responsible for develop-
ing a comprehensive, though sometimes confusing, set of rules for
determining the mens rea requirements of criminal statutes. Consid-
ering the lack of any statutory guidance on the subject prior to the
passage of the criminal code,11 it was not surprising that the Alaska
Supreme Court 12 assumed the lead in this area. The first major case
decided by the court was Speidel v. State. 13 Because Speidel and
subsequent cases have relied so heavily upon the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Morissette Y. United States' 4 it is first
necessary to briefly review that case.
A. Morissette
In Morissette, the defendant found rusting bomb casings while
he was hunting on government property. Morissette subsequently
carted away nearly three tons of the casings in broad daylight and
sold them for a total of eighty-four dollars.' 5 At trial Morissette
claimed that he believed that the casings were abandoned. 16 There
was substantial evidence, however, that cast doubt on whether Mor-
issette actually held that belief.17
Morissette was indicted under the theory that he "'did unlaw-
11. See infra text accompanying notes 223-26.
12. The Alaska Court of Appeals was not established until 1980. ALASKA STAT.
§ 22.07.010 (1982). Hereinafter, all references to the Alaska Court of Appeals will
be made by referring to the court of appeals unless the context requires otherwise.
Similarly, all references to the Alaska Supreme Court will be made by referring to
the court unless the context requires otherwise.
13. 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969).
14. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
15. Id at 247. As noted by Justice Jackson, the facts made the dispute "a pro-
foundly insignificant case to all except its immediate parties had it not been so tried
and submitted to the jury as to raise questions both fundamental and far-reaching in
federal criminal law." Id
16. Id at 248-49.
17. Id at 276. The court found that
the jury, considering Morissette's awareness that these casings were on
government property, his failure to seek any permission for their removal
and his self-interest as a witness, might have disbelieved his profession of
innocent intent and concluded that his assertion of a belief that the casings
were abandoned was an afterthought.
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fully, wilfully and knowingly steal and convert' property of the
United States,"' 8 in violation of a statute that applied to "'whoever
embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts' government prop-
erty" to his own use.19 The trial court, however, refused to instruct
on the defense that Morissette thought the casings were abandoned
and therefore did not act with criminal intent.20 Morissette's convic-
tion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.21
While the Sixth Circuit concluded that Morissette could only be con-
victed if he had "knowledge... that he [was] converting property
of the United States to his own use"22 and that "[g]eneraly speaking,
the question of whether property has been abandoned is, of course,
for the jury, '2 3 it nevertheless upheld the trial court's refusal to in-
struct on the abandonment defense based on Morisette's failure to
establish that the property had, in fact, been abandoned.2 4
Since Morissette was charged under a statute requiring that he
knowingly convert government property, it was hardly surprising
that his conviction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court
18. Id at 248.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976).
20. 342 U.S. at 249. The trial court concluded that it did not "'think [that]
anybody can have a defense [that] they thought the property was abandoned on
another man's piece of property,'" id, and essentially directed a verdict for the
government with the following instruction:
"And I instruct you to this effect: That if this young man took this prop-
erty (and he says he did), without any permission (he says he did), that was
on the property of the United States Government (he says it was), that it
was of the value of one cent or more (and evidently it was), that he is guilty
of the offense charged here. If you believe the government, he is
guilty. . ... The question on intent is whether or not he intended to take
the property. He says he did. Therefore, if you believe either 
side, he is
guilty."
Id The court of appeals conceded that "greater restraint in expression should have
been exercised" in the trial court's charge to the jury. Morissette v. United States,
187 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
21. 187 F.2d at 431.22. Id at 430.
23. I at 431.
24. In support of its holding, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the trial court
exercised a proper role in removing the abandonment defense from jury
consideration.[I-]ere, as the district ourt held, all the testimony proves that the property
had not been abandoned by the government of the United States, and the
district judge so instructed. The defense throughout was based upon insis-
tence that, in order to convict there must have been a criminal intent in thedefendant's mind. The trial judge had to meet that issue, and we think
correctly did so. He could not leave to the jury the interpretation of the
federal statute. No proof was adduced by the defendant to the effect that




based on the failure of the trial judge to allow the jury to consider
the defense of abandonment. 25 The Court stressed that the issue
whether Morissette actually believed that the property was aban-
doned was a question for the jury to decide based on its assessment
of the evidence presented at trial.26 Once the court of appeals ac-
knowledged that the government was required to establish that Mor-
issette knew he was converting government property,27 it should
have concluded that it was clear error for the trial court to have re-
moved the defense of abandonment from the jury. Morissette's pro-
fessed belief that the casings were abandoned was inconsistent with
the mens rea element required to sustain a conviction: knowledge
that the property belonged to the government. 28 The Court, how-
ever, added that this mens rea element did not require the govern-
ment to establish that Morissette knew that it was illegal to take the
property. Morissette could be convicted if he "had knowledge of the
facts, though not necessarily the law, that made the taking a
conversion." 29
In the course of reversing Morissette's conviction, the Court em-
barked on a general discussion of mens rea requirements in criminal
statutes.30 While some commentators have concluded that this dis-
cussion was not required in a case that appeared to involve only a
simple question of statutory construction,31 the Court nevertheless
recognized three important mens rea principles that would subse-
quently be applied by Alaska appellate courts: (1) that ordinarily
crimes require proof of mens rea 32 (2) that in a limited category of
public welfare offenses the legislature can dispense with the mens rea
25. See 342 U.S. at 276.
26. Id at 274.
27. 187 F.2d at 430.
28. 342 U.S. at 270-71. "[I]t is not apparent how Morissette could have know-
ingly or intentionally converted property that he did not know could be converted,
as would be the case if it was in fact abandoned or f he truy believed it to be aban-
doned and unwanted property. " Id at 271 (emphasis added). In recognizing that
Morissette could have a defense even if the casings had not in fact been abandoned,
provided that he "truly believed" that they had been abandoned, the Court implic-
itly rejected the conclusion by the court of appeals that only proof of actual aban-
donment could constitute a defense to the crime. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
29. 342 U.S. at 271.
30. Id at 250-63.
31. See, e.g., Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. Rav. 107,
121 (1962); Note, Criminal Law -Mens Rea -Requirement inActionfor ConvertingGovernment Properly - Necessityfor Criminal Intent, 5 VAND. L. Rv. 828, 830-31
(1952).
32. See 342 U.S. at 250-52; see also supra note 2.
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requirement;33 and (3) that a codification of a common law crime
that does not include an intent element will be interpreted to require
mens rea in the absence of a contrary legislative intent.34
In discussing the mens rea requirement of criminal statutes, the
Court acknowledged that "[t]he contention that an injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial
or transient notion. ' 35 In defining the precise level of intent required
in criminal statutes, however, it referred to the myriad terms used to
express the mens rea concept.
[C]ourts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different
offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for
the instruction of juries around such terms as "felonious intent,"
"criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty knowledge,"
"fraudulent intent," "wilfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty
knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental
culpability. By use or combination of these various tokens, they
33. See 342 U.S. at 252-60. The Court made the following general observations
about public welfare offenses:
These cases do not fit neatly into any of such accepted classifications of
common-law offenses, such as those against the state, the person, property,
or public morals. Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive
aggressions or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but
are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where
it imposes a duty. Many violations of such regulations result in no direct
or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or
probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. While such offenses do
not threaten the security of the state in the manner of treason, they may be
regarded as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the
efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently con-
stituted. In this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is
the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity.
Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does
not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will
the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than
society might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities.
Also, penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no
grave damage to an offender's reputation.
Id at 255-56.
The Court subsequently paraphrased Professor Sayre's categorization of of-
fenses that had previously been classified as public welfare offenses:
(I) illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of impure or adulterated
food or drugs, (3) sales of misbranded articles, (4) violations of an-
tinarcotic acts, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) violations of traffic regulations,
(7) violations of motor-vehicle laws, and (8) violations of general police
regulations, passed for the safety, health or well-being of the community.
I[d at 262 n.20 (citing Sayre, Public Wefare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. Rlv. 55, 73, 84-
87 (1933)).
34. See 342 U.S. at 252.
35. Id at 250.
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have sought to protect those who were not blameworthy in mind
from conviction of infamous common-law crimes.
3 6
While the Court noted that the many terms used to refer to the
intent requirement all adhere to the "central thought that wrongdo-
ing must be conscious," 37 it is important to note that this central
thought was not viewed as being distinct from the mens rea require-
ment. The Court instead concluded that the variety of terms used to
define the mental element insure that only a person "blameworthy in
mind" can be convicted of a crime38 To this extent, the concept of
mens rea may more appropriately be equated with the degree of
fault on the part of a defendant that justifies the imposition of a
criminal sanction.39 This, of course, would differ from the implica-
tion arising from the phrase consciousness of wrongdoing in that the
defendant must know that what he is doing is wrong to be convicted
36. Id at 252.
37. Id
38. Id
39. Professor Sayre has noted that the historical development of mens rea has
moved away from the requirement of an evil-doing mind to a mind that endangers
public interests.
[I]t seems clear that mens rea, the mental factor necessary to prove crimi-
nality, has no fixed continuing meaning .... Under the dominating in-
fluence of the canon law and the penitential books the underlying
objective of criminal justice gradually came to be the punishment of evil-
doing; as a result the mental factors necessary for criminality were based
upon a mind bent on evil-doing in the sense of moral wrong. Our modem
objective tends more and more in the direction, not of awarding adequate
punishment for moral wrong-doing, but of protecting social and public in-
terests. To the extent that this objective prevails, the mental element req-
uisite for criminality, if not altogether dispensed with, is coming to mean,
not so much a mind bent on evil-doing as an intent to do that which un-
duly endangers social or public interests. As the underlying objective of
criminal administration has almost unconsciously shifted, and is shifting,
the basis of the requisite mens rea has imperceptibly shifted, lending a
change to the flavor, if not to the actual content, of the criminal state of
mind which must be proved to convict.
Sayre, supra note 3, at 1016-17 (footnotes omitted).
In their criminal law treatise, Professors LaFave and Scott initially use the
phrase "state of mind" to refer to the mens rea requirement, which they equate with
"whatever element of blameworthiness, if any, a particular crime may require."
W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 2, at 5 n.2 (1972). Later
in the treatise, "state of mind" is equated with the term "fault."
[T]he terms "mental part" and "mens rea" and "state of mind" are some-
what too narrow to be strictly accurate, for they include matters that are
not really mental at all. Thus we shall see that, though many crimes do
require some sort of mental fault (i.e., a bad mind), other crimes (which
are commonly said to require mens rea) require some sort of fault which is
not mental. The unadorned word "fault" is thus a more accurate word to
describe what crimes generally require in addition to their physical
elements.
Id § 27, at 192 (footnote omitted).
1984]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
of a crime. In Morissette this level of fault could be established by
proof that the defendant knew he was taking government property.
Whether or not Morissette also knew that this act was improper was




Robert Speidel was convicted of willfully neglecting to return a
rental car to the Avis Rent-A-Car Company under the terms of his
rental contract. Under Alaska law at the time, this conduct was a
felony punishable by a maximum term of five years imprisonment. 41
While Speidel could be convicted only if he willfully neglected to
return the car, the term "wilfully neglects" was defined to mean
"omits, fails, or forbears, with a conscious purpose to injure, or with-
out regard for the rights of the owner, or with indifference whether a
wrong is done the owner or not."'42 In Speidel v. State,43 the court
reversed the defendant's conviction based on its conclusion that the
statute violated due process of law since it allowed conviction with-
out proof of consciousness of wrongdoing.44
The court began its opinion in Speidel by directly citing Moris-
sette as authority for the "universal rule that an injury can amount
to a crime only when inflicted by intention - that conduct cannot be
criminal unless it is shown that one charged with criminal conduct
had an awareness or consciousness of some wrongdoing. ' 45 Having
established that consciousness of wrongdoing is generally required
for the imposition of criminal liability, the court quickly disposed of
40. 342 U.S. at 271; see supra text acompanying note 29.
41. ALAsKA STAT. § 28.35.026 (1978) provides:
(a) A person in possession of a motor vehicle under an agreement in
writing which requires him to return the vehicle to a particular place or at
a particular time who refuses or wilfully neglects to return it to the place
and at the time specified in the agreement in writing with the intent to
deprive the owner of the vehicle or to convert it to his own use, or who
secretes, converts, sells or attempts to sell the vehicle or any part of it is,
upon conviction, punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years,
or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both.
(b) As used in this section "wilfully neglects" means omits, fails, or
forbears, with a conscious purpose to injure, or without regard for the
rights of the owner, or with indifference whether a wrong is done the own-
er or not.
42. See id
43. 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969).
44. Id at 80. The United States Constitution provides that no state shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The comparable provision of the Alaska Constitu-
tion appears in ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7.
45. 460 P.2d at 78 (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250 (footnote omitted)).
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the argument that the challenged statute was a public welfare offense
which could dispense with a mens rea requirement.46 The court then
noted that the crime of failing to return a rental vehicle included a
mens rea requirement: the defendant must willfully neglect to return
the vehicle.47 Consequently, the court did not have to decide
whether it could read an intent element into the crime; rather, the
issue in Speidel was whether the mens rea element included in the
crime satisfied the consciousness of wrongdoing requirement.48
The court acknowledged that under the portion of the definition
of "wilfully neglects" requiring the defendant to act "with a con-
scious purpose to injure," 49 the "statute incorporates an element of
conscious wrongdoing or criminal intent."50 However, under that
portion of the definition making it a crime to fail to return a motor
vehicle "without regard for the rights of the owner, or with indiffer-
ence whether a wrong is done the owner or not,"51 the consciousness
of wrongdoing standard was not met.5 2
Under this terminology it is possible for one to be found guilty of
the offense when there was an entire lack of any conscious depri-
vation of property or intentional injury. If one fails to return an
automobile out of neglect, without any intention to deprive the
owner of his property or to convert the property to his own use, or
of doing wrong to the owner, he is made guilty of afelony although
he may have acted unwittingly or inadvertently or negligently ...
To make such an act, without consciousnes [sic] of wrongdo-
ing or intention to inflict injury, a serious crime, and criminals of
those who fall within its interdiction, is inconsistent with the gen-
eral law. To convict a person of a felony for such an act, without
proving criminal intent, is to deprive such person of due process of
46. 460 P.2d at 79 (footnotes omitted).
The health, safety and welfare of the public is not involved. All that the
statute is concerned with is the protection of one select group of persons in
the business community - those who rent automobiles.
Moreover, as was indicated in Morissette, penalties for public welfare
offenses "commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave
damage to an offender's reputation." That is not true here. The penalty is
not small - the offender under [ALASKA STAT. § ] 28.35.026 is subject to
conviction of a felony and imprisonment for a term of five years. This
would do considerable damage to one's reputation. The basis for dispens-
ing with the requirement of criminal intent with respect to "public wel-
fare" types of offenses has no application in this case.
Id See supra note 33.
47. 460 P.2d at 79.
48. Id at 79-80.
49. ALASKA STAT. § 28.035.026(b) (1978); see supra note 41.
50. 460 P.2d at 80.
51. ALASKA STAT. § 28.035.026(b) (1978); see supra note 41.




The court was clearly correct in reversing Speidel's felony con-
viction under the principles specified in Morissette. Since the chal-
lenged statute was not a public welfare offense, it had to specify a
level of mens rea which would insure that only the "blameworthy in
mind" could be convicted of a crime.5 4 Under the definition of
"wilfully neglects," however, liability could be imposed even if the
defendant unwittingly failed to return the car.55 Consequently, while
the crime appeared to require proof of mens rea, the definition of
"wilfully neglects" allowed a conviction based on the simple failure
to return the car regardless of fault: the classic form of strict
liability.
The statute in Speidel was also interpreted to allow conviction if
the defendant's failure to return the car was "inadvertent" or "negli-
gent."'56 In such a case, as opposed to the situation where the de-
fendant acted unwittingly, the defendant has at least demonstrated
some degree of fault. In holding that the crime was valid only to the
extent that it applied to a person who failed to return a car "with [a]
conscious purpose to injure, ' 57 the court apparently concluded that
mere civil negligence 58 does not establish a constitutionally suffi-
cient degree of mens rea upon which to impose liability for a
felony.59
Having established that liability without fault, or liability based
53. Id (emphasis added).
54. See supra text accompanying note 38.
55. 460 P.2d at 80; see supra text accompanying note 53.
56. 460 P.2d at 80.
57. Id at 80-81.
58. See infra note 263 for the definition of negligent conduct applicable in civil
litigation.
59. "Under the terms of [ALASKA STAT. §] 28.35.026 there is no escape from a
felony conviction and a possible five-year prison term for simple neglectful or negli-
gent failure to return a rented automobile. . . ." 460 P.2d at 80. Subsequent cases
also emphasized that the constitutional infirmity of the statute in Speidel was that it
allowed conviction based on mere negligence. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d
105, 109 (Alaska 1975) ("Since the language of [ALASKA STAT. §] 28.35.026(b)...
encompassed mere inadvertent or negligent conduct, we held the statute to be inva-
lid to the extent that it made a person criminally liable for a felony without requir-
ing criminal intent."); Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 680 (Alaska 1971) ("We
emphasized that under the statute in [Speidel] a person might suffer a felony convic-
tion for a simple negligent failure to act."). But see Langesater v. State, 668 P.2d
1359, 1360 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Gudjonnson v. State, 667 P.2d 1254, 1256
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (discussed infra in text accompanying notes 273-74); Reyn-
olds v. State, 655 P.2d 1313, 1315-16 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam) (discussed
infra in text accompanying notes 150-51) (court of appeals applied a negligence




on civil negligence, was not a constitutionally sufficient basis for a
conviction, it was unfortunate that the court summarized its holding
by concluding that the challenged statute violated due process be-
cause it allowed a conviction without proof of consciousness of
wrongdoing.60 As subsequent cases would indicate, that phrase car-
ries the clear connotation that, at the very minimum, the defendant
must know that what he is doing is wrong: a requirement not im-
posed by either Morissette6' or Speide 62
C. Alex Speidel is Clarified
Less than two years after Speidel, the court had its first opportu-
nity to apply and clarify the rule that, ordinarily, proof of conscious-
ness of wrongdoing is required for the imposition of criminal
liability. In Alex v. State,63 the defendant was convicted of escaping
from the Palmer Adult Conservation Camp where he was serving a
sentence for a felony.6 4 At trial Alex requested and was denied a
jury instruction that" 'conduct cannot be criminal unless it is shown
that one charged with criminal conduct had an awareness or con-
sciousness of wrongdoing.' "65 As the supreme court acknowledged,
this instruction paraphrased language in Speidel.66 On appeal Alex
argued that consciousness of wrongdoing is an essential element of a
general intent crime such as escape and that the trial court commit-
ted error when it instructed that the state need not establish that he
knew that his act was wrong. 67
60. 460 P.2d at 80; see supra text accompanying note 53.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29 & 37-40.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 68-72 & 75-77.
63. 484 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1971).
64. ALASKA STAT. § 11.30.090 (repealed 1980) provided that a person in cus-
tody on a felony "who escapes or attempts to escape" from legal confinement was
guilty of a felony punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of three years.
Alex claimed that on the day of his escape he "was nervous, upset, and suffering
from dermatitis and lack of sleep." 484 P.2d at 678. He remembered walking down
a path near the camp's garbage dump, but then said he suffered a lapse of memory.
The path eventually led Alex outside the camp and to the Palmer Highway. Alex
next recalled being offered a ride by a woman and telling her that he needed to
return to the camp. The woman instead drove to a nearby liquor store and Alex
subsequently became intoxicated. For the second time that day, Alex "lost track of
what he was doing" and eventually found himself in Anchorage. Id He recalled
being frightened at having left the camp and tracked down an old girlfriend. When
he was arrested he was with the girlfriend and claimed that he was returning to the
Palmer camp. Id
65. 484 P.2d at 680.
66. Id
67. Id The entire mens rea instruction given by the trial court provided as
follows:
To constitute the criminal intent necessary in the crime of escape it is nec-
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In affirming Alex's conviction, the court found it necessary to
review Morissette and Speidel and to caution that "undue emphasis
should not be placed upon our use of the term 'wrongdoing' in [Spel-
del." s68 The court noted that in Morissette the United States
Supreme Court did not emphasize "a specific awareness of wrong-
fulness" 69 on the part of criminal defendants but instead cited the
variety of terms used to refer to the mental element in criminal stat-
utes.70 The court then concluded that the goal of Morisselte and
Speidel was not to require that a defendant know that his act was
unlawful, but rather to insure that criminal liability could not be im-
posed "for innocent or inadvertent conduct."'7'
The use of the phrase "awareness of wrongdoing" is but one
means of assuring this result. The phrase does not mean a person
must be aware that the conduct he is committing is specifically
defined as a wrongful act. Nor does it mean that a person must
know an act is proscribed by law. Rather, the requirement is that
a person's intent be commensurate with the conduct
proscribed....
So long as one acts intentionally, with cognizance of his be-
havior, he acts with the requisite awareness of wrongdoing.72
The court then turned to the intent instruction given at Alex's
trial. That instruction required the jury to find that Alex "'in-
tend[ed] to do an act which, if committed, would constitute a
essary that the person intend to do an act which, if committed, would con-
stitute a crime. Criminal intent exists whenever a person does that which
the law declares to be a crime, even though he may not know that he is
committing a crime or that his act is wrong.
Id
Alex's first point on appeal was that escape was a specific intent crime which
required that he leave confinement with "a specific intent to avoid the due course of
justice." Id at 678. Citing the majority rule, the court held that escape was a gen-
eral intent crime requiring merely "the voluntary intent to depart from custody."
Id at 679-80. The distinction between specific and general intent crimes was elimi-
nated in the Model Penal Code whose drafters saw "no virtue in preserving the
concept of 'general intent,' which has been an abiding source of ambiguity and of
confusion in the penal law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment at 128 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955). While the criminal code does not specifically retain the distinc-
tion between general and specific intent crimes, the commentary that accompanied
the passage of the criminal code refers to the culpable mental state of "intention-
ally" as being "comparable to the existing form of culpability commonly referred to
as 'specific intent."' ALASKA SENATE J. Supp. No. 47 at 140-41 (June 12, 1978).
68. 484 P.2d at 681.
69. Id
70. The Alaska Supreme Court cited that portion of Morissette which summa-
rized the wide variety of terms used to refer to the mental element in crimes. Id ; see
supra text accompanying note 36.
71. 484 P.2d at 681.
72. Id at 681-82.
[Vol. 1: 1
CONSCIOUSNESS OF WRONGDOING
crime,'" but did not require a finding that Alex "'[knew] that he
[was] committing a crime or that his act [was] wrong.' -73 The court
concluded that this instruction met the requirements of Speidel since
it required the jury to find that Alex left the camp "intentionally and,
therefore, with an awareness of his conduct. '74
Alex made two significant clarifications of the consciousness of
wrongdoing requirement adopted in Speidel. First, the court noted
that the phrase was but one way to insure that criminal liability
could not be imposed for innocent or inadvertent conduct.75 Second,
in approving an instruction that Alex need not "'know that he [was]
committing a crime or that his act [was] wrong,' ",76 the court empha-
sized that the phrase consciousness of wrongdoing does not require a
defendant to have acted with knowledge that his conduct was
improper.77
D. Campbell and Kimoktoak: Will the Court Read Mens Rea
into a Criminal Statute?
In State v. Campbell78 and Kimoktoak v. State, 79 the court con-
sidered whether it could read a mens rea requirement into criminal
statutes that do not specifically require proof of intent and appear to
impose criminal sanctions on the basis of strict liability or negligent
conduct. The answer to this question was of critical importance
since in Speidel the court apparently held that, ordinarily, liability
for a felony may not attach unless a person acts with a level of mens
rea greater than civil negligence.80 While Speidel recognized a lim-
ited exception to this rule in the case of public welfare offenses,81 the
crimes challenged in Campbell and Kimoktoak clearly did not fall
within that category. 2 Consequently, if a mens rea requirement
could not be read into the criminal statutes, they apparently would
73. Id at 680; see supra note 67.
74. 484 P.2d at 682.
75. Id at 681; see supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
76. 484 P.2d at 680; see supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
77. 484 P.2d at 681-82; see supra text accompanying note 72.
78. 536 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1975).
79. 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978).
80. See Speidel, 460 P.2d at 80; see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
81. Speidel, 460 P.2d at 78-79; see supra note 46 and accompanying text. While
the crime in Speidel did not fall within the public welfare exception, the court never-
theless recognized the existence of that exception. 460 P.2d at 78-79 (citing Moris-
sette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1952)).
82. In Campbell the court did not even consider whether the challenged crime,
which carried a maximum ten-year sentence, see infra note 85, could be classified as
a public welfare offense. This was not surprising since the state argued that a mens
rea requirement should be read into the crime. See infra text acompanying note 93.
InKimoktoak the state conceded that the challenged crime could not be classified as
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have to be declared unconstitutional under Speidel After initially
adopting a rule in Campbell which prohibited a court from reading a
mens rea element into a statute that did not codify a common law
crime,83 the court repudiated that rule three years later in
Kimoktoak. 84
1. Campbell. In Campbell the defendant was charged under a
statute that made it a crime to find and appropriate lost property
without attempting to return it to the owner by advertising the find
in a local newspaper or by contacting a peace officer.85 Since the
property that Campbell found was worth over $100, the crime was a
felony punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of ten
years.86 On its face the statute imposed strict liability on a person for
finding property that was in fact lost and failing to take affirmative
steps to locate its owner, regardless of whether he knew that the
property was lost or even acted with an awareness of a substantial
risk of that fact. 87 In this respect, the statute appeared to prohibit
conduct similar to that conduct prohibited under the trial court's
mistaken construction of the larceny statute in Morisselle, where the
defendant was prevented from arguing at trial that he believed that
the property he found was abandoned. 88
Prior to trial, Campbell moved to dismiss the charge on the ba-
sis that the statute violated due process since it did not require proof
of criminal intent and imposed criminal penalties for merely negli-
gent behavior.89 The trial court, relying solely on Speidel, granted
Campbell's motion,90 and the state appealed the dismissal to the
a public welfare offense. 584 P.2d at 29 n.2. This concession was also not surprising
since the crime carried a maximum ten-year sentence. See infra note 107.
83. 536 P.2d at 110.
84. 584 P.2d at 3 1.
85. ALASKA STAT. § 11.20.260 (repealed 1980) provided:
A person who finds lost property and appropriates it to his own use or
to the use of another person not entitled to it, without (1) immediately or
within a reasonable time advertising that fact in a paper of general circula-
tion published nearest the place where found, and setting out a full and
true description of the property, with marks of identification, if any, or (2)
notifying the peace officer nearest to the place where found and giving a
full and true description of the property, together with the time, place and
circumstances under which found, is guilty of larceny and is pumshable as
provided in § 140 of this chapter.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.20.140 (repealed 1980) provided in pertinent part as follows:
A person who steals money, goods, or chattels . . . which [are] the
property of another, is guilty of larceny. Upon conviction, if the property
stolen exceeds $100 in value, a person guilty of larceny is punishable by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 10 years.
86. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.20.140 (repealed 1980).
87. See id § 11.20.260 (repealed 1980).
88. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.




Alaska Supreme Court. In upholding the trial court's dismissal of
the charge, the court found it necessary, once again, to review Moris-
sette and Speide. Despite its warning inAlex that "undue emphasis
should not be placed upon our use of the term 'wrongdoing' in [Spei-
del, ]T91 the court cited Speidel as holding that "conduct cannot be
criminal unless it is shown that one charged with criminal conduct
had an awareness or consciousness of some wrongdoing. '92
In arguing that the challenged statute was constitutional, the
state contended that a constitutional level of intent could be read
into the crime by requiring the defendant to find the lost property
under circumstances that provide clues as to the ownership of the
property. If the defendant appropriated the property despite the
presence of such clues, the state argued that the element of wrongful
intent required by Speidel could be established. 93 The court, how-
ever, rejected this opportunity to construe the statute in a manner
that would uphold its constitutionality. While acknowledging its
duty to interpret statutes, whenever possible, in a manner that
"would harmonize the statutory language with specific constitutional
provisions, ' 94 the court concluded that an interpretation of this stat-
ute along the lines suggested by the state would violate the separa-
tion of powers doctrine.95
Central to the court's refusal to read a mens rea element into the
statute was its determination that the challenged statute did not cod-
ify a common law crime.96 The court cited Morissette for the rule
that if a codification of a common law crime failed to specify a mens
rea element, a court would read the common law intent requirement
into the statute.97 The court, however, then went on to cite Moris-
sette and Speidel for the rule that "intent can be found by implica-
tion only in statutes which represent codifications of a common law
91. 484 P.2d at 681; see supra text accompanying note 68.
92. Campbell, 536 P.2d at 108 (quoting Speidel, 460 P.2d at 78) (footnote
omitted).
93. 536 P.2d at 110.
94. Id (footnote omitted).
95. Id at I 11. The court observed that the separation of powers doctrine "pro-
hibits this court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective statutes." Id at
Ill & n. 19 (citing ALASKA CoNsT. art. II, § 1 (vesting the legislative power of the
state in a legislature consisting of a senate and house of representatives) and
ALASKA CONsT. art. IV, § 1 (vesting the judicial power of the state "in a supreme
court, a superior court, and the courts established by the legislature")).
96. The court noted that the common law crime. of misappropriation of prop-
erty required the presence of two elements that were missing from the challenged
statute: (1) an intent by the defendant to convert the property absolutely to his own
use, and (2) circumstances surrounding the finding which provide clues for deter-
mining the identity of the owner. Id at 110.
97. Id at 107-08.
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crime."' 98 Yet, as the court was to acknowledge three years later in
Kimoktoak, neither Morissette nor Speidel established that rule.99
While the prohibition established in Campbell against reading a
mens rea element into a statute that did not codify a common law
crime was later overruled in Kimoktoak, 100 it is important to note
that with the publication of Campbell in 1975, the court had formu-
lated two significant rules on mens rea requirements. 10 The first was
adopted in Speidel, and provided that except for a limited number of
public welfare offenses a person may not be convicted of a felony
unless that person acted with a level of intent greater than civil negli-
gence. 0 2 In Speidel this was referred to as a consciousness of wrong-
doing requirement.10 3 In Alex the court explained that the phrase
consciousness of wrongdoing did not require the defendant to know
that his act was wrong.'0 4 The second mens rea rule was adopted in
Campbell and prohibited a court from reading a mens rea element
into a statute that did not codify a common law crime. 0 5 Consid-
ered together, these two rules meant that the courts would declare a
statute establishing a felony crime unconstitutional if it did not in-
clude a mens rea element greater than civil negligence, did not codify
a common law crime, and could not be classified as a public welfare
offense.
2. Kimoktoak. Three years after Campbell, in Kimoktoak v.
State, 106 the court was faced with a constitutional challenge to a con-
viction under a statute that, in part, made it a felony for the driver of
a car involved in an accident to fail to render assistance to a person
he injured.'0 7 At trial the jury was instructed that the defendant
must be shown to have had knowledge of the incident but was told
98. Id at 110 (emphasis added).
99. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
100. Id
101. The effect of these two rules on the effort to revise the criminal laws of
Alaska is discussed elsewhere in this article. See infra text acompanying notes 227-
28.
102. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
103. 460 P.2d at 78.
104. 484 P.2d at 681; see supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
105. 536 P.2d at 109-10.
106. 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978).
107. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.060 (1978) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in in-
jury to or death of a person or damage to a vehicle which is driven or
attended by a person shall give his name, address, and vehicle license
number to the person struck or injured, or the operator or occupant, or the
person attending, and the vehicle collided with and shall render to any
person injured reasonable assistance ....
(c) A person who fails to comply with a requirement of this section
regarding assisting an injured person is, upon conviction, punishable by
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that it could find that the defendant had the requisite knowledge
"where the circumstances involving the incident were such that they
would lead a reasonably prudent person to assume that an accident
resulting in injury to a person must have occurred."' 0 8
Kimoktoak's first argument on appeal was that the statute under
which he was convicted did not specifically require knowledge by the
driver that the accident or injury occurred. To allow conviction
under such circumstances, Kimoktoak contended, would violate due
process since he could have been found guilty even though he was
unaware of any wrongdoing. 0 9 No doubt relying on Campbell,
Kimoktoak argued that the court could not read a mens rea require-
ment into the statute since it did not codify a common law crime. 110
On its face, as the state was willing to concede, the challenged
statute did not require a defendant to act with an awareness that an
accident or injury had occurred.1" Since the statute did not codify a
common law crime, 112 the trial court apparently lacked authority
under Campbell to read a mens rea element into the statute. If the
court was to apply the Campbell rule, it was clear that Kimoktoak's
conviction would have to be reversed. The court, however, rejected
the Campbell rule in Kimoktoak.
The court cited four reasons why it was necessary to repudiate
the Campbell rule. First, while in Campbell the court cited Speidel
and Morissette for the rule that mens rea could only be read into a
imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or by a fine of not more than
$10,000, or by both.
108. 584 P.2d at 31. The entire instruction provided as follows:
Knowledge by the driver of the incident is necessary before he may be
found guilty under Count I. However, you need not find that the driver
had actual knowledge. You may find that the driver had the required
knowledge where the fact of the accident and injury was visible and obvi-
ous or where the circumstances involving the incident were such that they
would lead a reasonably prudent person to assume that an accident result-
ing in injury to a person must have occurred.
Count I of the indictment is not a crime which requires a specific
wrongful intent to commit.
Id at 31-32.
109. Id at 28-29. The circumstances of the case in fact raised the issue of
whether Kimoktoak had knowledge of the accident or the injury. While driving a
car without the owner's permission, Kimoktoak twice ran over his victim while try-
ing to pull out of a bar parking lot. When police arrived at the scene Kimoktoak
sped away and refused to stop even after a police officer fired a shot through the
back window. Kimoktoak was apparently extremely intoxicated at the time. Per-
haps the most remarkable aspect of the case was that the victim, who also was intox-
icated, did not remember being run over even though his injuries required
hospitalization for nearly a month. Id at 27-28.
110. See id at 28.
111. Id at 29.
112. See id at 30.
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statute that codified a common law crime, the court on closer exami-
nation determined that neither case actually established such a
rule." 3 Second, the court cited two of its own decisions, decided
before Campbell, in which a mens rea element was read into a statute
that did not codify a common law crime. 1 4 Third, the court cited
several cases from other jurisdictions where a mens rea requirement
was read into statutes similar to the Alaska provision." 5 Finally, the
court stressed its duty to construe statutes so as to avoid a finding of
unconstitutionality. I16
Having determined that it had the authority to read a mens rea
element into the statute,' 17 the court next had to decide what level of
intent should be required. The court concluded that to sustain a
conviction the state must establish "that the driver actually knew of
the injury or that he knew that the accident was of such a nature that
one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a per-
son." '" 8 The jury instruction given at trial was deficient under this
standard since it failed to require a finding that Kimoktoak knew
that the accident was of a type that one would "'reasonably antici-
pate'" would result in injury.' 9 The court stressed that before the
jury could determine whether a person would have reasonably be-
lieved that the accident resulted in injury, it must first find that the
defendant knew the nature of the accident since "[i]t is not the rea-
sonable person who is on trial but the defendant .... ,520
113. [We would note that neither Morissette nor Speidel, the two cases from
which the Campbell rule was derived, establishes the principle that crimi-
nal intent may not be found by implication in statutes which do not codify
a common law crime. A close reading of Morissette reveals that the court
only suggested in dicta that where a legislature creates a new statutory
offense but omits a criminal intent requirement, a court in some cases may
not be warranted in implying the requisite intent. Similarly, the reasoning
in Speidel may have suggested that criminal intent may not be found by
implication where a statute creates a new offense, but that case does not
establish this as a broad rule to be applied in all cases.
Id at 30 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
114. Id (citing Thomas v. State, 522 P.2d 528, 530 n.4 (Alaska 1974); Judd v.
State, 482 P.2d 273, 280 (Alaska 1971)). Both Thomas and Judd involved prosecu-
tions under the former Alaska Narcotic Drug Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.10.010-.240
(repealed 1982). In both cases it was held that a statute prohibiting the possession of
certain illegal drugs required the drugs to be "knowingly" possessed. Thomas, 522
P.2d at 530; Judd, 482 P.2d at 280. Neither case was cited in Campbell
115. 584 P.2d at 31 & n.6.
116. Id at 31.
117. Id
118. Id at 32.
119. Id; see supra note 108.
120. 584 P.2d at 32.
[Vol. 1:1
CONSCIOUSNESS OF WRONGDOING
E. Rice and Reynolds Mens Rea Will Be Read into a Crime
Unless a Contrary Legislative Intent Clearly Appears
In State v. Rice 121 and Reynolds v. State, 122 the Alaska appellate
courts adopted and applied a rule of construction that criminal stat-
utes would be "strictly construed to require some degree of mens rea
absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary."' 23 Not only did this
highlight the clear break from the discredited Campbell rule in
Kimoktoak, but it also emphasized the judicial hostility toward strict
liability crimes.
1. Rice. Rice was a big game guide who transported in his
airplane moose meat that apparently had been taken by a client in
violation of a regulation prohibiting killing game the same day that a
hunter flew to the hunting site.124 Rice was convicted in district
court of violating a regulation that made it a misdemeanor to "pos-
sess or transport any game. . . illegally taken."'125 The trial court
refused to give Rice's proposed jury instruction that to convict him
the jury must find that he "either knew, or reasonably should have
known" that the meat was taken illegally.126 Rice successfully ap-
pealed his conviction to the superior court based on the trial court's
failure to give this instruction, 27 and the reversal of his conviction
by the superior court was subsequently upheld by the Alaska
Supreme Court. However, as Justice Matthews was to note in his
concurring opinion, the reasons given by the court for reading a mens
rea requirement into the regulation were "somewhat unfocused."'
28
Chief Justice Rabinowitz began the majority opinion in Rice by
adopting a rule of construction that had not previously been recog-
nized by the court.
It must be remembered that strict liability is an exception to the
121. 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981).
122. 655 P.2d 1313 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
123. Rice, 626 P.2d at 108 (emphasis added); see Reynolds, 655 P.2d at 1315-16.
124. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 81.070(b)(6) (repealed, and reinacted in 1980
as ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 81.075(4) (July 1983)) provides that it is an illegal
hunting method for "a person who has been airborne... [to] thereafter take or
assist in taking big game until after 3:00 a.m. following the day the flying occurred."
See Rice, 626 P.2d at 106 & n.1. This regulation is sometimes referred to as the
"same day airborne" rule. Rice was acquitted on the same day airborne charge. Id
125. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 81.140(b) (July 1983); see supra note 124.
Rice was sentenced to thirty days imprisonment and fined $500; his aircraft was
forfeited to the state pursuant to ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.195 (1977) (amended 1983).
Rice, 626 P.2d at 106.
126. 626 P.2d at 107.
127. Id at 106.
128. Id at 115 (Matthews, J., concurring). Justice Matthews proposed a test
whereby a mens rea requirement would be read into any crime that authorized a
term of imprisonment upon conviction. Id at 116.
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rule which requires criminal intent. Criminal statutes will be
strictly construed to require some degree of mens rea absent a
clear legislative intent to the contrary. Even when a statute, or a
regulation, does not explicitly require any element of mens rea, we
will scrutinize the statute or regulation to determine whether mens
rea must be made part of the definition of the particular
offense. '
29
In adopting this rule of construction, the court effectively cre-
ated a presumption that all crimes, even those traditionally classified
as public welfare offenses, 30 would be interpreted to require mens
rea absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary. The court itself
recognized that the status of the challenged offense as a fish and
game regulation "might perhaps be considered by some to be suffi-
cient to justify characterization. . . as a strict liability offense."' 13
Indeed, in the earlier case of Nelson v. State, 132 the court appeared to
recognize the need for strict liability in some game violations. In
Nelson the court held that a regulation prohibiting the taking of a
cub bear in "its first or second year of life" did not require the state
to establish that the hunter knew or should have known the bear's
age, since requiring proof of such knowledge "would mean that the
regulation could not be enforced." 33 In Nelson the court failed to
cite any clear statement of legislative intent to impose strict liability.
Application of the Rice rule of construction in Nelson might have
required a reversal of the conviction. 34
In Rice the court announced a rule of construction that appar-
ently would have required it to determine whether there was an ex-
pression of legislative intent to impose strict liability under the
129. Id at 108 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
130. See supra note 33 for a discussion of the common characteristics and catego-
ries of public welfare offenses.
131. 626 P.2d at 108.
132. 387 P.2d 933 (Alaska 1964).
133. Id at 935.
134. Rice did not cite Nelson. It is, therefore, unclear whether Nelson would be
decided differently today. In Reynolds v. State, 655 P.2d 1313 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982) (per curiam), the court of appeals implied that the regulation challenged in
Nelson would be upheld even under the Rice rule of construction since the problems
of establishing the defendant's awareness of the bear's age made the "imposition of
strict liability ... clearly justified." Id at 1316. However, there was no indication
in Nelson of a clear expression of legislative intent to impose liability regardless of
the defendant's knowledge of the bear's age. Therefore, application of the Rice rule
would not appear to warrant the imposition of strict liability. Reynolds may, how-
ever, be read as recognizing a limited exception to the Rice rule of construction in
cases where imposition of a mens rea requirement would make a criminal regulation




challenged regulation.135 The court did not, however, next consider
whether such intent had been expressed. Instead, it held that under
the regulation the defendant must "'know or reasonably should
know' 136 that the meat was illegally taken, since without that level
of intent the regulation would be unconstitutionally vague and viola-
tive of substantive due process.137
Despite the fact that the court in Rice never applied the rule of
construction which it adopted in that opinion, the decision is signifi-
cant in tracing the judicial development of mens rea rules in Alaska
for three reasons. First, it established the rule of construction that
requires a court to read a mens rea element into all crimes absent a
clear legislative intent to impose strict liability.' 38 Second, while the
court quoted approvingly from the consciousness of wrongdoing lan-
guage in Speidel, 139 it held that this requirement could be satisfied by
showing that Rice knew or reasonably should have known that the
meat was illegally taken without referring to an additional require-
135. 616 P.2d at 108.
136. Id at 110 (quoting the superior court).
137. Id at 109-10. The court noted that without the specified level of intent the
crime would be overbroad since it would allow forfeiture of an aircraft for shipping
illegally taken meat without knowledge on the part of the owner of the aircraft that
the meat was taken illegally. The regulation would therefore be void for vagueness
since it did not give adequate notice of what was prohibited. Id
Justice Matthews, however, disagreed with this analysis.
The concept of overbreadth as it is used in vagueness cases refers to a lack
of fair notice as to what conduct is punishable. Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3,
8 (Alaska 1974). Here there is fair notice in the sense that the regulation is
linguistically precise in delineating the type of conduct proscribed. The
problem with it is that it includes within its ambit the conduct of people
who have no reason to believe that what they are doing is criminal. I sug-
gest, therefore, that the vagueness rationale does not support the conclu-
sion reached.
Id at 115 (Matthews, J., concurring).
The majority also concluded that if the regulation imposed strict liability it
would violate substantive due process because "if enforced according to its literal
terms, . . . [it] would bear no reasonable relationship to the legitimate regulatory
purpose underlying it." Id at 110.
Justice Matthews also disagreed with the majority's substantive due process
analysis, concluding that
this is at best a tangential expression of what is wrong with the regulation.
There certainly is a legitimate government interest in preventing the un-
lawful killing of game, and imposing strict forfeiture or criminal fines on
persons who transport unlawfully killed game bears a relationship to the
accomplishment of that purpose.
Id at 115 (Matthews, J., concurring).
138. Id at 108.
139. Id at 107 (quoting a discussion of Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 78 (Alaska
1978) in State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 838 (Alaska 1978)).
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ment that Rice must have known that this conduct was wrong. 140 To
the extent that the court's holding inHentzner v. State14 1 can be read
as requiring proof in all malumprohibitum crimes that the defendant
knew that his conduct was wrong, 142 and to the extent that the regu-
lation in Rice was a malum prohibitum crime, 143 the court in Rice
may have implicitly rejected this broad interpretation of Hentzner.
Finally, in reading a level of intent into the regulation, the court did
not require Rice to act with positive knowledge that the meat was
taken illegally. Instead, merely establishing that Rice reasonably
should have known that the meat was unlawfully taken would satisfy
the minimum mens rea requirement. 44
2. Reynolds. In Reynolds v. State 45 the recently established
court of appeals" faced one of its first opportunities to tackle the
mens rea issue. Reynolds was convicted of fishing in closed waters, a
crime punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of one
year. 147 The regulation that served as the basis for the prosecution
did not require a defendant to act with any form of mens rea regard-
ing the location of his boat in closed waters. 148 The trial court inter-
preted the regulation to impose liability if Reynolds' boat entered
closed waters, regardless of whether he intended the entry. 149 In re-
versing Reynolds' conviction, however, the court of appeals con-
cluded that by not requiring "evidence that Reynolds was at least
negligent with respect to the location of his boat, the court here im-
140. Id at 110.
141. 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980).
142. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
143. A strong argument can be made that the challenged regulation in Rice is a
malum prohibitum crime under the definition adopted in Hentzner. See infra text
accompanying note 175 (defining malumprohibitum). Even assuming that "reason-
ing members of society" are willing to conclude that taking a moose the same day
that a hunter is airborne is condemnable, it is doubtful that a similar consensus
would be reached regarding the actions of a pilot who knowingly transports that
meat.
144. 626 P.2d at 110.
145. 655 P.2d 1313 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
146. See supra note 12.
147. Pursuant to ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.251(2) (1983), the Board of Fisheries had
designated certain areas as closed waters. Reynolds had fished in one of those areas.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.720(a) (1983) provides that it is a misdemeanor to violate any
of the board's regulations pertaining to commercial fisheries. See Reynolds, 655
P.2d at 1314.
148. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 06.350(b) (July 1983) "does not, on its face,
require any accompanying mental state or criminal intent." Reynolds, 655 P.2d at
1314 (footnote omitted). By contrast, the court noted that other fishing regulations
do require proof that the defendant "knew or should have known" of a particular
circumstance. Reynolds, 655 P.2d at 1314 n.l.
149. 655 P.2d at 1314.
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posed a classic form of strict liability .... [The trial judge erred in
not requiring some minimal element of mens rea, ie., negligence, to
accompany Reynolds' conduct."' 50 The court of appeals acknowl-
edged that this negligence standard could be met by establishing that
Reynolds "knew or reasonably should have known" the location of
the boat.' 5 '
The reversal of Reynolds' conviction by the court of appeals
was hardly remarkable considering its citation of Speidel and Rice
"for the proposition that criminal statutes should be strictly con-
strued to require some degree of mens rea absent a clear legislative
intent to the contrary."' 5 2 It could have been argued that the chal-
lenged regulation in fact expressed a legislative intent to impose
strict liability since similar regulations required proof that the de-
fendant "knew or should have known" of a particular circum-
stance.'5 3 The court of appeals apparently concluded that the use of
mens rea terms in related offenses could not be relied upon to indi-
cate a clear legislative intent to impose strict liability under the chal-
lenged regulation. The court did, however, recognize two
circumstances from which it would infer an intent to impose strict
liability: (1) a specific statement in the statute defining the crime that
strict liability is intended; or (2) legislative history indicating an in-
tent to impose strict liability. 54 In subsequent cases the court of ap-
peals would cite Reynolds as authority for reading a mens rea
element into fish and game regulations that did not specifically re-
quire proof of intent. 55
150. Id at 1315.
151. Id at 1316-17. In Langesater v. State, 668 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983) and Gudjonnson v. State, 667 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), the
court of appeals again referred to the minimum mens rea requirement that would be
read into misdemeanor fish and game regulations as a negligence standard. See
infra text accompanying notes 273-76.
152. Reynolds, 655 P.2d at 1315.
153. See, e.g., regulations cited in Reynolds, 655 P.2d at 1314 n.l.
154. 655 P.2d at 1316. Following the court of appeals decision in Reynolds, fish
and game regulations were amended to expressly provide for strict liability. Lange-
sater v. State, 668 P.2d 1359, 1360 n.l (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
155. In Langesater v. State, the court of appeals required the state to establish
under a misdemeanor fish and game regulation that the defendant knew or should
have known that his boat was in excess of the maximum length allowed for a boat
registered for salmon net fishing. 688 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). Sim-
ilarly, in Gudjonnson v. State, the court of appeals interpreted a regulation, making
it a misdemeanor to take undersized crab, to require proof that the defendant knew
or should have known that the crab was undersized. 667 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1983) (citing Reynolds, 655 P.2d at 1316-17). In both cases, the court of
appeals referred to the "knew or should have known" mens rea requirement as re-




Reynolds is particularly significant in tracing the judicial devel-
opment of mens rea requirements in Alaska because it marked the
first time an Alaska appellate court cited the extensive culpable
mental state provisions in the criminal code in deciding whether a
crime outside Title 11 could dispense with a mens rea element. 156
While the court of appeals noted that the culpable mental state pro-
visions in the criminal code only apply to crimes in Title 11, it never-
theless referred to them as "persuasive in [their] logic.' 5 7 In fact, if
the general provisions in the criminal code pertaining to culpable
mental state requirements applied to the regulation challenged in
Reynolds, the court of appeals would likewise have been required to
read a mens rea element into the regulation, though not the same one
it adopted.158
F. Hentzner: Consciousness of Wrongdoing Sometimes Means
What It Says
In Hentzner v. State, 159 the defendant challenged his convictions
for willfully offering and selling securities that had not been regis-
tered with the state.1 60 In 1975, Hentzner offered, through a newspa-
156. 655 P.2d at 1316 n.4. Both Rice, and Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821
(Alaska 1980) (see infra text accompanying notes 159-86), were published after the
January 1, 1980 effective date of the criminal code (see supra note 4), but neither
decision cited any of the culpable mental state provisions in the criminal code.
157. 655 P.2d at 1316 n.4. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.640 (1983) provides that the
culpable mental state provisions in the criminal code apply only to crimes defined in
Title 11.
158. Since no mens rea requirement was specified in the regulation and no legis-
lative intent to dispense with this requirement was expressed, ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.81.600(b)(2) (1983) (see infra note 237) would have required the court to read a
mens rea requirement into the regulation if it was included in Title 11. Applying
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b)(2) (1983) (see infra text accompanying note 251), the
state would have been required to establish that Reynolds acted recklessly as to the
circumstance of fishing in closed waters. It is contended elsewhere in this article
that the mens rea term of "knows or reasonably should have known" used by the
court of appeals in Reynolds, and subsequent cases, requires the state to establish a
lesser form of mens rea than would be required under the definition of recklessly in
the criminal code. See infra text accompanying notes 272-79.
159. 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980).
160. Hentzner was convicted of two counts of offering and two counts of selling
unregistered securities. Id at 822. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.070 (1980) provides that
"[i]t is unlawful for a person to offer or sell a security in this state unless (I) it is
registered under this chapter or (2) the security or transaction is exempted under
[ALASKA STAT. §] 45.55.140 (1980).
The criminal penalty provision, ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.210(a) (1980), states:
A person who wilfully violates a provision of this chapter except [ALASKA
STAT. §] 45.55.160, or who wilfully violates a rule or order under this chap-
ter, or who wilfully violates [ALASKA STAT. §] 45.55.160 knowing the state-
ment made to be false or misleading in a material respect or the omission
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per advertisement, to sell gold at eighty dollars an ounce 161 to
anyone who sent a purchase order with advance payment. Hentzner
promised delivery within eight months and represented that he
needed the money to buy equipment to begin mining operations at a
location which had a ninety-nine percent chance of success.' 62 Sev-
eral people sent money, and Hentzner in fact began to mine and
continued to do so until he was ordered by the state to stop. 163 After
concluding that what Hentzner offered for sale was a security,' 64 the
court turned to the argument that his convictions must be reversed
because the state was not required to prove that he acted with
"knowledge of wrongdoing."165
The jury instructions given at Hentzner's trial required the jury
to find that he acted "wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with spe-
cific intent to violate the law."' 66 The instructions further defining
this mens rea requirement were not a model of clarity. 167 In re-
sponse to a jury question, the trial judge told the jury that it could
ignore the term feloniously and that Hentzner did "'not have to in-
to be misleading by any material respect, upon conviction, is punishable
by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not less than one
year nor more than five years, or both. Upon conviction of an individual
for a felony under this chapter, imprisonment for not less than one year is
mandatory. However, no individual may be imprisoned for the violation
of a rule or order if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or
order.
161. The court referred to this price as "considerably below [the) market price."
613 P.2d at 822. At the time Hentzner ran his advertisement, gold was selling at
$184.05 an ounce. Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1975, at 24, col. 4.
162. The full text of Hentzner's newspaper advertisement appears in Hentzner,
613 P.2d at 822 n.2.
163. Id at 823.
164. The court concluded that Hentzner's solicitation of money with the promise
of profits to investors if he was successful was an investment contract. 613 P.2d at
823-24. See generally SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.55.130(12) (1980) defines "security" to include an "investment contract."
165. 613 P.2d at 825.
166. Id (footnote omitted).
167. The instructions cited by the court provided as follows:
As used in these instructions, the word "unlawfully" means contrary
to law.
"Willfully" is defined as an act done intentionally and purposely and
with specific intent to do that which the law forbids.
"Feloniously" means with criminal intent and evil purpose.
The crimes charged in this case require proof of specific intent before
the defendant can be convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies, means
more than the general intent to commit the acts. To establish specific in-
tent the State must prove that the defendant willfully offered to sell unreg-
istered and non-exempt securities and willfully sold unregistered and non-
exempt securities. Such intent may be determined from all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case.
Id at 825 n.8.
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tentionally violate the law; [but that] he [did] have to intentionally
do the acts which are prohibited by law.' "168 On appeal the state
argued that the only mens rea required to establish a willful violation
of the statute was an intent to offer and to sell the securities even
though Hentzner might not have known that his conduct was unlaw-
ful.169 Relying on a recent law review article discussing the culpabil-
ity requirements of the federal securities laws, the court noted that
there were three possibilities for defining the term willfully.
70
One is that the defendant must act intentionally in the sense that
he is aware of what he is doing; another is that the defendant must
be aware that what he is doing is illegal; and a third is that the
defendant must know that what he is doing is wrong. It is in this last
sense that we think "wilfully" should be interpreted. .... 17m
In requiring the state to establish that Hentzner must have
known that what he was doing was wrong, the court appeared to
return to the interpretation of the consciousness of wrongdoing re-
quirement that it rejected in Alex. that the defendant must act with
an awareness that what he is doing is improper. 72 The court, how-
ever, read Alex very narrowly to hold only that proof of an aware-
ness of wrongdoing is not required if the crime is malum in se, which
was defined as a crime "which reasoning members of society regard
as condemnable."' 73
If the crime is malum in se, the court concluded the mere com-
mission of the prohibited act establishes an awareness of wrongdoing
and therefore it is appropriate to allow conviction upon a showing of
"no more than a consciousness of the conduct in question."' 74 If, on
the other hand, the crime is malumprohibitum, which was defined as
a crime where "there is no broad societal concurrence that [the pro-
scribed conduct] is inherently bad," an awareness of wrongdoing be-
yond the doing of the act would be required since the mere conscious
doing of the act does not necessarily establish that the defendant
knew that the act was wrong. 175 The court quickly concluded that
offering or selling unregistered securities is a malum prohibitum
crime 176 that could not be classified as a public welfare offense be-
168. Id at 825.
169. Id
170. Id at 825 & n.9 (citing James, Culpability Predicates For Federal Securities
Laws Sanctions The Present Law And The Proposed Federal Securities Code, 12
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5-6 (1974)).
171. 613 P.2d at 825 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
172. Alex, 484 P.2d at 680-82; see supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
173. Hentzner, 613 P.2d at 826.
174. Id (citing Alex, 484 P.2d at 680-82).




cause of its substantial penalty. 177 The court then reversed
Hentzner's convictions because the jury was not required to find that
he acted with knowledge that what he was doing was wrong. 17
There are several ways to categorize the holding in Hentzner.
Under the narrowest interpretation, it could be argued that all the
court held was that the crime of willfully offering or selling unregis-
tered securities requires proof that the defendant knew that what he
was doing was wrong. 179 If this was the extent of the court's holding,
it was based on a small number of federal and state cases interpret-
ing similar statutes. 80 Alternatively, it can be argued that the court
held that in any prosecution involving a willful violation of the se-
curities laws, the state must establish that the defendant knew that
what he was doing was wrong.' 8' If this was what the court held, its
holding was based on a more substantial body of case law interpret-
ing similar statutes. 8 2 Under the third and broader interpretation, it
177. Id at 826-27. Each of the four counts against Hentzner carried a maximum
sentence of five years and the court noted that Hentzner faced a maximum sentence
of twenty years. See supra note 160.
178. 613 P.2d at 825-27.
179. Hentzner was only charged with selling unregistered securities and not with
the fraudulent sale of securities. See supra note 160. Thus, while the court framed
the issue in Hentzner as involving "the meaning of the word wilfully, as used in
[ALASKA STAT. §] 45.55.210(a)," 613 P.2d at 825, the court's interpretation of the
word willfully may be viewed as applying only in the context of the sale of unregis-
tered securities and not to other conduct covered by ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.210(a).
See supra note 160 for the text of ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.210(a). This narrow inter-
pretation of the holding in Hentzner, finds support in Jeffcoat v. State, 639 P.2d 308
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982), where the court of appeals noted that in Hentzner the court
construed "the meaning of the term 'willfully' as it appeared in a statute prohibiting
the sale of unregistered securities." Id at 312.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 942 (2d Cir. 1961) (court
reversed defendants' convictions because facts did not show "guilty knowledge and
purpose"); see also, e.g., Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970) (court approved instruction requiring "guilty
knowledge" without ruling on whether that knowledge was actually required);
United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 331 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
845 (1964) (same); Roe v. United States, 316 F.2d 617, 621 n.9 (5th Cir. 1963)
(same). But see, e.g., State v. Hodge, 204 Kan. 98, 107-08, 460 P.2d 596, 604-05
(1969) (all that "willfully" requires "is proof that the person acted intentionally in
the sense that he was aware of what he was doing"); State v. Russell, 119 N.J. Super.
344, 351, 291 A.2d 583, 587-88 (1972) (quoting Loss & Cow=r, BLUE SKY LAW 273
(1958)).
181. See 613 P.2d at 825, where the court framed the issue as involving "the
meaning of the word 'wilfully' as used in [ALASKA STAT. §] 45.55.210(a)."
182. See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1370-71 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'don other grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (defendant indicted under penalty provi-
sion of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982), for will-
ful misuse of nonpublic information); United States v Charney, 537 F.2d 341, 350-
53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976) (defendants indicted under § 32(a) of
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can be argued that the court held that some crimes that are defined
to require willful conduct must be interpreted to require an actual
awareness of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant. 183 If this was
the court's holding, it was also based on substantial authority. 184
The final, and broadest, interpretation of the court's holding is that it
required proof of an awareness of wrongdoing for all malumprohib-
itum crimes, regardless of whether the crime prohibited willful con-
the Securities Exchange Act for alleged market manipulation); United States v.
Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1395 (2d Cir. 1976) (defendant convicted under § 32(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act for willfully failing to include certain material information
in a proxy statement); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971) (defendant convicted under penalty provision of§ 32(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act for illegally effectuating a short sale); Van Antwerp
v. State, 358 So. 2d 782, 786 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (defendant convicted under
ALA. CODE § 8-6-18 (1974) (amended 1979) for willfully violating fraud statutes);
State v. Cox, 17 Wash. App. 896, 903, 566 P.2d 935, 940 (1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 823 (1978) (defendant convicted under WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.400 (1974),
for willfully violating fraud provisions of WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.010 (1974)); see
also, e.g., Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (defendant's bro-
ker/dealer registration revoked for willful violations of anti-fraud statutes; court
found that defendant acted willfully on the basis that she "continue[d] her methods
of operation in spite of repeated advice that those methods were unlawful"). But
see, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1009 (1972) (defendant convicted of violating § 32(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act for willfully violating antihypothecation statute); People v. Clem, 39
Cal. App. 3d 539, 542, 114 Cal. Rptr. 359, 361 (1974) (defendants convicted under
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25540 (West 1977) (amended 1977), for willfully selling unqual-
ified securities); State v. Russell, 119 N.J. Super. 344, 351, 291 A.2d 582, 587-88
(1972) (defendant indicted under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-70(a) (West 1970), for will-
fully defrauding stockholders and willfully attempting to sell securities through un-
registered and unlicensed agents).
183. See 613 P.2d at 827 n.12, where the court noted that the Supreme Court has
several times construed "willfully" in criminal statutes other than the securities laws
to require at least an awareness of wrongdoing.
184. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221 (1961) (willful failure to
account for taxes); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945) (willful depriva-
tion of constitutional rights); Speis v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497-98 (1943)
(willful evasion of taxes); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933) (will-
ful violation of Revenue Act); United States v. Krosky, 418 F.2d 65, 67 (6th Cir.
1969) (willful failure to submit for induction into army); Williams v. United States,
402 F.2d 47, 49 (10th Cir. 1967) (willful violation of injunction order); United States
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 408 F. Supp. 450, 463 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (willful violation of Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act); State v. Hall, 90 Idaho 478, 489-90, 413 P.2d 685, 692
(1966) (willful wasting of water for irrigation); State v. Oyen, 78 Wash. 2d 909, 916-
17, 480 P.2d 766, 770-71 (1971) (willfully loitering about a public school), vacated on
other grounds, 408 U.S. 933 (1971). But see, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 171 F.2d
986, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 1948), aft'd, 339 U.S. 162 (1950) (willful failure to respond to
subpoena); McBurney v. State, 280 Md. 21, 29 & n.6, 371 A.2d 129, 133-34 & n.6
(1977) (willful violation of statute prohibiting attorneys from commingling funds
entrusted to them); State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523, 536-38, 253 A.2d 612, 620 (1969)
(willfully striking police officer).
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duct.185 If this was what the court held, it failed to cite any authority
in support of this holding. 186
185. See 613 P.2d at 826, where the court noted that the "crime of offering to sell
or selling unregistered securities is malumprohibitum, not malum in se. Thus, crimi-
nal intent in the sense of consciousness of wrongdoing should be regarded as a sepa-
rate element of the offense . . . ." Id (footnote omitted). But see supra text
accompanying notes 141-43 where it is argued that the court in Rice may have im-
plicitly rejected this broad interpretation of Hentzner.
186. Indeed, the one case that arguably supports a conclusion that some malum
prohibitum crimes that do not require willful conduct, nevertheless require proof
that the defendant acted with an awareness of wrongdoing, Lambert v. California,
355 U.S. 225 (1957), was not even cited inHentzner. InLambert, the defendant was
convicted under a Los Angeles municipal ordinance that made it a misdemeanor for
a convicted felon to remain in Los Angeles for more than five days without register-
ing with the police. Id at 226. Lambert was prevented from testifying at trial that
she was unaware of the registration requirement, and the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, in affirming her conviction, held that it was no defense that she did
not know of the registration requirement. See Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme
Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 128 (1962).
In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court reversed
Lambert's conviction, holding that "actual knowledge of the duty to register or
proof of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are
necessary before a conviction under the ordinance can stand." 355 U.S. at 229.
While acknowledging that "'the rule that ignorance of the law will not excuse'...
is deep in our law," id at 228 (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218
U.S. 57, 68 (1910)), the Court emphasized that the challenged ordinance punished
"conduct which is wholly passive - mere failure to register," 355 U.S. at 228, and
noted that violation of the ordinance "is unaccompanied by any activity whatever,
mere presence in the city being the test." Id at 229. The Court was careful, how-
ever, to differentiate such passive conduct from "the commission of acts, or the fail-
ure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his
deed." Id at 228.
At first glance, it might be concluded that Lambert involved a substantial de-
parture from the principle that ignorance of the law is ordinarily not a defense to a
crime. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
§§ 27, 28, at 191-203 (1972). Justice Frankfurter, however, writing in dissent, did
not appear particularly concerned, stating that he was "confident that [Lambert] will
turn out to be an isolated deviation from the strong current of precedents - a dere-
lict on the waters of the law." Id at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter may have been correct in his prediction. Indeed, in the
years immediately following Lambert, the decision seemed to be largely ignored by
the courts, including the Supreme Court. See Packer, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. at 135-37.
Even if the analysis and holding in Lambert continue to have validity, Lambert does
not support the conclusion that all malumprohibitum crimes require that the defend-
ant be aware of actual wrongdoing. Instead, Lambert appears only to hold that
criminal liability may not be imposed based on the failure to act under circum-
stances where nothing places the defendant on notice regarding the duty to act. See
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229.
It is therefore not surprising that Lambert was not cited inHentzner. Hentzner's
prosecution was not based on passive conduct, as was the case in Lambert. Rather,
Hentzner affirmatively engaged in a course of conduct to raise money for his gold
mining scheme. His conduct did not consist of common, everyday activities; and the
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G. Wheeler.- Hentzaner Clarified?
After Wheeler v. State8 7 it is questionable whether Hentzner
can be cited for even the narrowest holding suggested by that opin-
ion.188 Like Hentzner, Wheeler was convicted of willfully selling un-
registered securities.18 9 The facts in Wheeler, however, supported
the conclusion that the defendant also intended to defraud inves-
tors. 190 Wheeler was convicted of three counts of securities fraud
and three counts of selling unregistered securities.' 9 '
Three instructions were given at Wheeler's trial to define the
elements for the three counts of selling unregistered securities. 92
The instruction for one of those counts provided as follows:
The necessary and material allegations of Count V, each of which
the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt before you can
find the defendant guilty, are as follows:
1. That on or about September 19, 1978, while outside the
state of Alaska, Cletus R. Wheeler did wilfully and unlawfully;
circumstances surrounding his activities were sufficient to have alerted him to a duty
to investigate the possibility of the regulation of his conduct. Cf. United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (defendant convicted of violating statute making it
unlawful to receive or possess hand grenades; knowledge of registration require-
ment not necessary because the possession of hand grenades was hardly an innocent
act; sufficient that defendant knew that the instrument possessed was a dangerous
weapon); United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1983) (defendants
convicted of violating firearm laws by possessing and transferring unregistered auto-
matic machine guns; no requirement that defendant actually knew the weapons had
to be registered; "enough to prove he [knew] that he [was] dealing with a dangerous
device of such type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation") (quoting
United States v. De Bartolo, 482 F.2d 312, 316 (1st Cir. 1973)); Reyes v. United
States, 258 F.2d 774, 784 (9th Cir. 1958) (defendants, convicted narcotics users, were
convicted of failing to register before leaving the country; no requirement that de-
fendants know of registration requirement because crossing the border into another
country is rarely an unrestricted act and is sufficient to put people on notice to in-
quire whether the law requires them to do anything).
Consequently, despite some broad language in Hentzner suggesting that its
holding was based on the mere fact that offering or selling an unregistered security
is a malum prohibiturn crime, see supra text accompanying notes 176-79, the only
authority supporting such a holding, Lambert, is inapplicable to the facts of
Hentzner.
187. 659 P.2d 1241 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
188. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
189. 659 P.2d at 1242.
190. See id at 1242-46. Wheeler planned and organized a business investment
sales scheme involving the sale of a program for acquiring and operating vending
machines. The scheme involved franchising vending machines by Wheeler at a time
when he had not acquired any machines or goods. Wheeler's partner in the scheme
referred to the selling plan as "entirely speculative or 'blue sky.'" Id at 1246.
191. Id at 1242.
192. Id at 1250.
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2. Sell a security to Waldo Carrasco at or near Anchorage,
Third Judicial District, State of Alaska;
3. Said security having not been registered at the time of its
sale as required by the Alaska Securities Act;
4. With reckless disregard for the fact that the business op-
portunity being offered was a security. 193
With regard to the word "wilfully", used in paragraph one of
the instruction, the jury was told that "[a]n act is done wilfully if
done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to do
something the law forbids; that is to say with bad purpose either to
disobey or to disregard the law."' 194 To clarify the meaning of "reck-
less" in paragraph four of the instruction, the trial court defined the
word in a context that "closely tracked" the definition of recklessly
in the criminal code. 195
At first glance, it is difficult to understand how Wheeler could
have argued on appeal that these instructions failed to require a find-
ing that he had acted "'knowingly and deliberately with bad pur-
pose'" as to each element of the offense. 196 Even assuming that
Hentzner imposed this mens rea requirement, the instructions
seemed to satisfy Wheeler's proposed intent formulation' 97 by re-
quiring that he act willfully198 and by defining that term as requiring
proof of an intentional act done with a bad purpose. 199 While it is
puzzling how Wheeler could have legitimately quarreled with these
instructions, it is even more interesting that the court of appeals, in
affirming his conviction, used its decision to attempt to clarify the
court's holding in Hentzner.
Because of the broad definition of "willfully" used by the court
at Wheeler's trial,200 the court of appeals was provided with an easy
193. Id at 1251 n.13.
194. Id at 1250 n.12.
195. Id at 1251. The instruction on recklessness provided as follows:
A person acts recklessly in connection with the sale of a security when he is
aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the business venture he sells is a security. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that disregard of it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the same
circumstances.
Id at 1251 n.15. See infra text accompanying note 256 for the definition of "reck-
lessly" in the criminal code.
196. Id at 1250.
197. The court of appeals, however, agreed with Wheeler's interpretation of the
instructions and, in a footnote, dismissed the state's argument that the term
"wilfully" in paragraph one of the instructions also applied to other paragraphs in
the instructions. Id at 1251 n.14.
198. See supra text accompanying note 193.




opportunity to uphold the jury instructions under the Hentzner re-
quirement that the defendant must actually know that the act of sell-
ing unregistered securities was wrong. 20 1 Indeed, at one point the
court of appeals concluded that a common sense interpretation of
the instructions "strongly suggests that their net effect was to inform
the jury that, at the very least, it would be required to find that
Wheeler's conduct was voluntary and deliberate and that he either
actually knew he was unlawfully selling unregistered securities or he
recklessly disregarded that fact. 2o2
The court noted that this common sense reading of the instruc-
tions was more favorable to Wheeler than Hentzner required20 3 and
stressed that the use of a recklessness standard in paragraph four of
the instruction "complied with the court's duty, under Hentzner, to
inform the jury that Wheeler could be convicted only if he acted
with an awareness of wrongdoing. ' '2°4 Further, the court of appeals
concluded that "a more stringent definition of the awareness of
wrongdoing standard than that contained in [the criminal code's def-
inition of 'recklessly'] would require subjective knowledge by the ac-
cused that his conduct was in fact illegal. ' 205 As the court of appeals
emphasized, "[s]ubjective knowledge of illegality was. . . expressly
rejected as a definition of wilfulness by the court in Hentzner. "206
After reviewing Wheeler, it is difficult to conclude precisely
what form of mens rea is required to establish the crime of willfully
offering or selling unregistered securities. In Hentzner, the state ar-
gued that the crime merely requires an intent to offer and sell the
security, regardless of whether the defendant knew that the conduct
was unlawful.207 That contention, however, was rejected by the
court in holding that the defendant must "know that what he is do-
ing is wrong."208 In Wheeler the court of appeals concluded that the
Hentzner consciousness of wrongdoing requirement could be satis-
fied by establishing that Wheeler acted recklessly as to whether what
he sold was a security.2°9 Does it necessarily follow, however, that a
201. See supra text accompanying note 171.
202. 659 P.2d at 1251 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
203. See id at 1251 n.14.
204. Id at 1252.
205. Id
206. Id; see supra text accompanying note 171.
207. See supra text accompanying note 169.
208. See supra text accompanying note 171.
209. The court further concluded that
the trial court's choice of criminal recklessness as the requisite measure of
criminal intent was appropriate as a means of implementing the awareness
of wrongdoing requirement expressly adopted in Hentzner. The subjective
component of criminal recklessness seems entirely consistent with the
awareness of wrongdoing standard. When the accused is subjectively
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person who acts recklessly as to whether what he is selling is a secur-
ity also knows or is reckless as to whether it is wrong not to register
the security with the state? Despite the fact that Wheeler, for exam-
ple, knew it was wrong to defraud investors, can it also be said be-
yond a reasonable doubt that he also knew that he was committing
another wrong by not registering the security or was reckless in this
regard?210
The difficulty in attempting to reconcile Wheeler with Hentzner
can be traced to the court's observation in Speidel that most crimes
require proof of consciousness of wrongdoing.211 As has been
stressed in this article, the phrase "consciousness of wrongdoing"
should be viewed simply as a shorthand reference to the mens rea
requirement in criminal statutes.212 Except in the rare case where a
crime includes a mens rea term that can be interpreted to require
proof that the defendant knew that his act was improper,213 or in the
"aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk"
that his conduct may be unlawful or that it may lead to unlawful results, it
is difficult to imagine how he could realistically be said to have acted with-
out an awareness of wrongdoing. Moreover, a more stringent definition of
the awareness of wrongdoing standard than that contained in [ALASKA
STAT. §1 11.81.900(a)(3) would require subjective knowledge by the ac-
cused that his conduct was in fact illegal. Subjective knowledge of illegal-
ity was, however, expressly rejected as a definition of "wilfuliness" by the
court in Hentzner.
659 P.2d at 1252.
210. Wheeler, no doubt, acted with an actual awareness that his conduct was
wrong when he offered his investment scheme. The instructions on the three counts
of securities fraud specifically required the jury to find that Wheeler acted with an
intent to defraud, id at 1250 n. 11, and Wheeler was convicted on those counts. See
supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. Perhaps the affirmance of Wheeler's
conviction was based on the unexpressed rationale that Wheeler's consciousness of
wrongdoing in committing the three counts of securities fraud also satisfied the con-
sciousness of wrongdoing requirement for the three counts of selling "unregistered
securities.
This explanation for the court of appeals decision in Wheeler finds some sup-
port in the subsequent case of Bell v. State, 668 P.2d 829 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). In
Bell the court of appeals appeared to recognize that in some prosecutions the fact
that the defendant's conduct also constitutes an uncharged, less serious crime may
permit the elimination of the culpable mental state requirement for a particular ele-
ment of the more serious crime that is the basis for the prosecution. See id at 833.
Professors LaFave and Scott, however, have referred to this doctrine as the "lesser
legal wrong" theory and have concluded that it is "unsound, and has no place in a
rational system of substantive criminal law." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK
ON CRIin AL LAW § 47, at 361 (1972).
211. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 37-45 & 75-77.
213. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text. There are some crimes in
the criminal code that require the defendant to know that his conduct is improper,
but this requirement is clearly specified in the statute defining the crime. See infra
note 323.
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even rarer case where liability is based on the failure to act under
circumstances where nothing places the defendant on notice regard-
ing the duty to act,21 4 awareness by the defendant that he is commit-
ting a wrongful act is irrelevant to whether the requisite mens rea
element has been established.
The crime of willfully offering or selling an unregistered secur-
ity may, in fact, be one of the few exceptions to the general rule that
proof of an actual awareness of wrongdoing is irrelevant to the mens
rea inquiry. Indeed, as previously noted,215 there is some authority
that the crime requires the prosecution to establish that the defend-
ant knew that he was committing an improper act. If this narrowest
interpretation of Hentzner216 continues to remain good law, Wheeler
must be viewed as being premised on the unexpressed rationale that
when a person acts recklessly as to whether what he is selling is a
security, he is put on notice of the duty to inquire whether there is
government regulation in the area. If the person then offers to sell
the security without complying with the registration requirement, it
may then be concluded that he acted with an awareness of
wrongdoing.217
Alternatively, the court of appeals may have concluded that the
Hentzner requirement that the defendant must know that his con-
duct was wrong218 was merely another way to refer to the conscious-
ness of wrongdoing requirement, 21 9 which could be satisfied by
showing that the defendant acted with a level of mens rea greater
than civil negligence.220 If this was the basis for the holding in
Wheeler, the application of a recklessness standard in paragraph
four of the instruction 221 would have insured that Wheeler could not
have been convicted based on strict liability. Despite the court's rea-
soning to the contrary, however, the recklessness standard did not
also insure that Wheeler could be convicted only if he knew he was
acting improperly unless it is presumed that all persons who act
recklessly as to whether what they are selling is a security also act
214. See supra note 186.
215. See cases cited supra note 180.
216. See supra text accompanying note 179.
217. Cf. federal cases cited supra in next to the last paragraph of note 186.
218. See supra text accompanying note 171.
219. While the court of appeals quoted from the passage in Hentzner where the
court required proof that the defendant "must know that what he was doing [was]
wrong," Wheeler, 659 P.2d at 1250 (quoting Hentzner, 613 P.2d at 825), it also re-
ferred to the "awareness of wrongdoing" standard throughout the opinion.
220. The court of appeals characterized the chief concern of Hentzner as insuring
that a person could not be convicted of selling unregistered securities "based upon
application of strict liability or upon a mere finding of civil negligence." 659 P.2d at
1252.
221. See supra notes 193 & 195 and accompanying text.
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recklessly as to whether they are acting improperly in not registering
the security with the state.222
It is apparent that legislative clarification or further judicial in-
terpretation will be required before it can be said with reasonable
certainty what form of mens rea must be established to sustain a
prosecution for willfully offering or selling an unregistered security.
Resolution of this issue, however, is unlikely to have much signifi-
cance outside of its effect on securities prosecutions since no crime in
the criminal code is defined to require proof of willful conduct. The
ambiguities raised by Hentzner and Wheeler, however, emphasize
the continuing difficulties that the Alaska appellate courts are exper-
iencing in applying the consciousness of wrongdoing requirement.
II. CULPABLE MENTAL STATES IN THE CRIMINAL CODE: A
COMPARISON WITH THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO MENS RF4
In 1978, the Alaska legislature adopted a new criminal code.223
One of the major incentives for the revision was the haphazard ap-
proach to mens rea in the existing statutes.2 24 This concern was sum-
marized in the legislative commentary that accompanied passage of
the criminal code.
[T]he important area of culpable mental states is one of great con-
fusion and uncertainty in existing law. The proliferation of culpa-
ble mental state terms coupled with their haphazard use hampers
the interpretation of individual sections and frustrates one of the
principal purposes of the mens rea concept: providing a structure
for the classification of offenses according to their degree of
blameworthiness. Additionally, some statutes are exposed to con-
stitutional attack by their failure to specify a culpable mental
state, or by their specification of an unconstitutional form of
culpability. 225
222. The court of appeals concluded that "[w]hen the accused is subjectively
'aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk' that his
conduct may be unlawful or that it may lead to unlawful results, it is dgicult to
imagine how he could realistically be said to have acted without an awareness of
wrongdoing." Wheeler, 659 P.2d at 1252 (emphasis added).
The instruction in paragraph four (see supra text accompanying note 193) did
not, however, require the defendant to disregard a risk that it was unlawful to fail to
register the security with the state; it merely required that he disregard the risk that
his investment scheme constituted a security. The court of appeals' qualifying lan-
guage, "it is difficult to imagine," may have highlighted its own uncertainty regard-
ing its conclusion.
223. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 219 (effective Jan. 1,
1980). A history of the events leading up to the revision of the criminal code ap-
pears in Stem, The Proposed Alaska Revised Criminal Code, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L.
REv. 1, 1-6 (1977).




Prior to the adoption of the criminal code, at least twenty differ-
ent and undefined terms were used in Title 11 to denote mens rea. 
226
As the commentary to the criminal code indicated, the legislature
was well aware of the constitutional problems caused by the failure
to include a mens rea term in a crime or by the specification of an
unconstitutional form of culpability. In summarizing the criminal
code rules on culpable mental states, the Criminal Code Revision
Subcommission specifically cited Speidel and Campbell to illustrate
the substantial problems that arise from the lack of a coherent ap-
proach to mens rea. 227 In this respect, there was a clear relationship
between the holdings in Speidel and Campbell and the effort to re-
vise Alaska's outdated criminal laws. Campbell, in particular, high-
lighted the urgent need for revision. The legislature recognized that
the courts would declare a criminal statute unconstitutional if it did
not include a constitutionally sufficient form of mens rea, did not
codify a common law crime, and could not be classified as a public
welfare offense.228
The culpable mental state provisions that were adopted in the
criminal code were patterned after similar sections in the Model Pe-
nal Code229 and recent state criminal code revisions that were also
based on the Model Penal Code.230 The criminal code uses only
four culpable mental states - intentionally,231 knowingly, 232 reck-
226. See ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REV., pt. 2, at 13 (rent. Draft 1977); Stem,
supra note 223 at 9 n.47. Title 11 of the Alaska Statutes contains the substantive
provisions of the criminal code.
227. ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REv., pt. 2, at 20 (Tent. Draft 1977).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05. The Campbell rule against read-
ing a mens rea element into a statute that did not codify a common law crime was
still good law at the time the legislature considered adoption of the criminal code. It
was not until September 1, 1978, over two months after the code was passed, that the
court in Kimoktoak reversed its rule in Campbell. See supra text accompanying
notes 111-16. The criminal code received final legislative approval on June 16,
1978. ALASKA HOUSE J. 1715 (June 16, 1978). Thus, despite the fact that the court's
shortlived rule in Campbell was incorrect, it can, nevertheless, be concluded that it
had a positive effect on law reform in Alaska by adding to the list of reasons for
comprehensively revising the criminal law.
229. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(l)-(4) (1983) and id §§ 11.81.600-
.610 with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
230. A list of the state criminal code revisions that were relied upon in revising
Alaska's criminal laws appears in Stem, supra note 223 at 3 n.9. The Alaska Court
of Appeals recently concluded that the New York Penal Code, N.Y. PENAL LAW
(McKinney 1975), is the primary state criminal code to be consulted in determining
the meaning of ambiguous sections in the Alaska criminal code. See Neitzel v.
State, 655 P.2d 325, 327 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
231. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(1) (1983) provides as follows:
a person acts "intentionally" with respect to a result described by a provi-
sion of law defining an offense when the person's conscious objective is to
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lessly,233 and criminal negligence234 - and includes rules that gov-
ern their application to crimes in Title 11.235 For purposes of
comparing the legislative approach to culpable mental state require-
ments with the judicial treatment of mens rea surveyed in Part I of
this article, three highlights of the culpable mental state sections in
the criminal code will now be examined.
A. The Presumption Against Strict Liability Crimes
The criminal code contains a codification of the rule adopted in
Rice, that the failure of the legislature to include a mens rea element
in a crime is insufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion that it in-
tended to create a strict liability offense.236 In section 11.81.600(b) of
the Alaska Statutes, 237 the criminal code states the general rule that a
culpable mental state is required for all Title 11 offenses. 238 There
cause that result; when intentionally causing a particular result is an ele-
ment of an offense, that intent need not be the person's only objective;...
232. Id § 11.81.900(a)(2) provides as follows:
a person acts "knowingly" with respect to conduct or to a circumstance
described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person is
aware that the conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists;
when knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an
offense, that knowledge is established if a person is aware of a substantial
probability of its existence, unless the person actually believes it does not
exist; a person who is unaware of conduct or a circumstance of which the
person would have been aware had that person not been intoxicated acts
knowingly with respect to that conduct or circumstance ....
233. See infra text accompanying note 256 for the definition of "recklessly" ap-
pearing in ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(3) (1983).
234. See infra text accompanying note 282 for the definition of "criminal negli-
gence" appearing in ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(4) (1983).
235. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.600-.640 (1983).
236. See supra text accompanying note 129.
237. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b) (1983) provides as follows:
A person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acts with a culpable
mental state, except that no culpable mental state must be proved
(1) if the description of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state
and the offense is
(A) a violation; or
(B) designated as one of "strict liability"; or
(2) if a legislative intent to dispense with the culpable mental state require-
ment is present.
(Citations omitted).
238. An "'offense' means conduct for which a sentence of imprisonment or fine
is authorized; an offense is either a crime or a violation." ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.81.900(b)(33) (1983). A "'crime' means an offense for which a sentence of im-
prisonment is authorized; a crime is either a felony or a misdemeanor." ALASKA
STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(9) (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 240-42 for a dis-
cussion of the term "violation."
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are, however, three limited exceptions to the culpable mental state
requirement.
The first exception is when the offense is a violation which does
not specifically require proof of a culpable mental state.239 A "viola-
tion" is defined as "a noncriminal offense punishable only by a fine,
but not by imprisonment or other penalty. ' 240 A maximum fine of
$300 is authorized upon conviction of a violation.241 There are only
a handful of violations in the criminal code, 242 and since they do not
describe criminal conduct they are appropriately not subject to any
implied culpable mental state requirement.
The second circumstance in which a culpable mental state is not
required is when an offense is "designated as one of 'strict liabil-
ity.' "243 This would be the clearest way for the legislature to express
its intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement. Cur-
rently, however, no crime in the criminal code is specifically desig-
nated as a strict liability offense.2 4
The final situation in which a culpable mental state is not re-
quired is when "a legislative intent to dispense with the culpable
mental state requirement is present. '245 This exception is consistent
239. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b)(1)(A) (1983); see supra note 237.
240. Id § 11.81.900(b)(56).
241. Id § 12.55.035(b)(5) (Supp. 1982).
242. See, e.g., id § 11.51.125 (1983) (failure to permit visitation with a minor); id
§ 11.76.100 (selling or giving tobacco to a minor).
243. Id § 11.81.600(b)(1)(B); see supra note 237.
244. In Reynolds v. State, 655 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (per
curiam), the court noted:
Especially in the context of regulatory provisions, which can be modified
or re-enacted more expeditiously and with less complexity than can formal
statutory provisions, we do not think it unrealistic to expect that, if a provi-
sion is intended to create a strict liability offense, an express statement to
that effect will be included.
245. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b)(2) (1983); see supra note 237. In Bell v. State,
668 P.2d 829, 835 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), the court applied this exception to the
crime of promoting prostitution in the first degree, ALASKA STAT. § 11.66.110
(1983), and held that a legislative intent to impose strict liability as to one element of
the offense (knowledge that the victim was under 16) was clearly present.
The language of ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b)(2) (1983), supra note 237, is not
the original formulation adopted by the legislature when it passed the criminal code.
The original version of section 11.81.600(b)(2) provided that a culpable mental state
need not be proved if an intent to dispense with the element "cleary appears."
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b)(2) (1978) (amended 1980) (emphasis added). The
1980 change does not, however, appear to have significantly altered the scope of this
exception. The commentary adopted by the legislature which accompanied the
1980 change merely notes that "the courts should be specifically authorized to con-
sider the legislature's intent (and most importantly, the commentary accompanying
passage of the code) in determining whether the legislature intended to dispense
with the culpability requirement in a particular statute." ALASKA SENATE J. SUPP.
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with the court's observation in Reynolds that an intent to dispense
with a mens rea element may be found in the legislative history of a
statute.246 Of course, as the legislature itself recognized in its com-
mentary accompanying the 1980 amendment to this provision, "the
decision to eliminate the culpable mental state requirement must
comport with constitutional due process guarantees. '247 Thus, while
the legislature may intend to create a strict liability crime, ultimately
it is the court's responsibility to determine whether the crime meets
the requirements of a public welfare offense as specified in Moris-
sette248 and Speidel. 249
Considered together, the provisions of section 11.81.600(b) of
the Alaska Statutes effectively establish a presumption against a
judicial finding that the legislature intended to create a strict liability
crime in the criminal code. Except where an offense is a violation,
the failure to include a culpable mental state in a crime does not
warrant a finding that strict liability was intended. Either a clear
statement of legislative intent to impose strict liability appearing in
the statute or an equally clear statement of intent appearing in the
legislative history will be required. In this regard, section
11.81.600(b) is consistent with the decisions in Kimoktoak, Rice, and
Reynolds, in which a mens rea element was judicially implied in
crimes defined outside the criminal code. In these cases the legisla-
ture did not include a mens rea element in the definition of the chal-
lenged crime, nor did it specify an intent to impose strict liability. In
each case, however, the appellate courts read a mens rea element into
the crime.
B. Recklessly as the Minimum Culpable Mental State that Will
Be Judicially Implied
Having established that the mere absence of a culpable mental
state in the definition of a crime does not warrant a judicial determi-
No. 44, at 19 (May 29, 1980). Presumably, under the original formulation of section
11.81.600(b)(2) the courts were also authorized to consider the legislature's intent
that was expressed in the commentary to the criminal code in determining whether
strict liability was intended. The removal of the requirement that the intent to dis-
pense with the culpable mental state element must "clearly appear" may, however,
make the state's burden of establishing a strict liability offense somewhat easier than
its burden under the original version.
246. See supra text accompanying note 154; see also Langesater v. State, 668 P.2d
1359, 1360 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), where the court of appeals in reading a mensrea
requirement into a regulation prohibiting fishing with an overlength vessel noted:
"The state has not called to our attention any legislative history indicating that [the
regulation] was intended to be applied as a strict liability offense ..
247. ALASKA SENATE 3. Supp. No. 44, at 18-19 (May 29, 1980).
248. See supra note 33.
249. See supra note 46.
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nation that strict liability was intended by the legislature, 250 the
criminal code specifies the culpable mental state which must be read
into the crime.
(b) Except as provided in [Alaska Stat. §] 11.81.600(b), if a provi-
sion of law defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable
mental state, the culpable mental state that must be proved with
respect to
(1) conduct is "knowingly"; and
(2) a circumstance or a result is "recklessly. '251
The distinction between the conduct, circumstance, and result
elements of a crime is not always an easy determination to make.252
It is apparent, however, that as to the circumstance and result ele-
ments of a crime, the minimum culpable mental state requirement
that can be read into a crime is "recklessly. '253 In the case of con-
duct elements, the prosecution must establish that the conduct was
done "knowingly. ' 254 Under no circumstances can the culpable
mental state of "criminal negligence" be judicially implied into a
crime.255 The criminal code defines "recklessly" in the following
manner:
250. See supra text accompanying notes 236-49.
251. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b) (1983).
252. In making the distinction, however, it is useful to consider the following
discussion appearing in the commentary to the criminal code:
The Code distinguishes between three elements of offenses to which
the culpable mental states apply ....
The first element, conduct, involves the nature of the proscribed act or
the manner in which the defendant acts. Kidnapping, for example, re-
quires that one person restrain another. The conduct might be the locking
of the only door to a windowless room. Knowingly is the culpable mental
state applicable to conduct. The second element, circumstances surround-
ing the conduct, refers to a situation having a bearing on the actor's culpa-
bility. Kidnapping requires that the person inside the room not consent to
being restrained. Lack of consent is an example of a circumstance sur-
rounding the actor's conduct, and is an element of the crime. Knowingly,
recklessly, and criminal negligence are the culpable mental states associ-
ated with the existence of circumstances. The result of the actor's conduct
constitutes the final element. Kidnapping can occur if the victim is ex-
posed to a substantial risk of serious physical injury. Intentionally, reck-
lessly, and criminal negligence are the culpable mental states associated
with results.
ALASKA SENATE J. Supp. No. 47, at 140 (June 12, 1978). See generally Neitzel v.
State, 655 P.2d 325, 328-30 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
253. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b)(2) (1983); see supra text accompanying note
251.
254. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b)(1) (1983); see supra text accompanying note
251.
255. "'Criminal negligence' will not apply unless the term is expressly included




[A] person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or to a
circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense
when the person is aware of and consciously disregards a substan-
tial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the cir-
cumstance exists; the risk must be of such a nature and degree that
disregard of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation
256
In Andrew v. State, 257 the court of appeals held that the defini-
tion of "recklessly" as it applies to the crime of theft by receiving,258
is not impermissibly vague and satisfies "the due process require-
ment of criminal intent." 259 The court emphasized that the defini-
tion of "recklessly" in the criminal code (as well as the definition of
"criminal negligence") was "expressly formulated to preclude mere
civil negligence from forming the basis for a criminal conviction.
Thus, . . . [the definition] require[s] a 'gross deviation' from the
standard of care that 'a reasonable person would observe in the situ-
ation.' "260 Additionally, the court of appeals quoted the commen-
tary accompanying the passage of the criminal code that contrasted
the definition of "recklessly" with the definition of "criminal
negligence. '261
The test for recklessness is a subjective one - the defendant must
actually be aware of the risk. On the other hand, if criminal negli-
gence is the applicable culpable mental state, the defendant will be
criminally liable if he "fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists."
The test for criminal negligence is an objective one - the defend-
ant's culpability stems from his failure to perceive the risk.2 62
A review of the cases surveyed in Part I of this article in which
Alaska appellate courts have read a mens rea term into crimes de-
fined outside the criminal code reveals an apparent lack of consis-
tency in the intent element which has been applied. In some cases
the implied level of mens rea has been similar or identical to the
definition of "recklessly" in the criminal code. In other cases, the
courts have applied a civil negligence standard263 which appears to
256. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(3) (1983).
257. 653 P.2d 1063 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
258. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.190(a) (1983) provides that "[a] person commits theft
by receiving if the person buys, receives, retains, conceals, or disposes of stolen
property with reckless disregard that the property was stolen."
259. 653 P.2d at 1066.
260. Id (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(3)-(4) (1983)) (footnote omitted);
see also Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241, 1251-52 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
261. 653 P.2d at 1066 n.5.
262. Id (quoting ALASKA SENATE J. Supp. No. 47, at 142 (June 12, 1978)).
263. In Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d
1113 (Alaska 1980), the court defined "negligent" conduct as "that which breaches
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allow the prosecution to establish less than would be required under
the definition of criminal negligence in the criminal code.
In Kimoktoak, for example, the level of mens rea read into the
challenged statute pertained to the circumstance that the defendant
had been involved in an accident where injury resulted.264 While the
court did not require Kimoktoak to have had positive knowledge of
the injury, it did require that "he knew that the accident was of such
a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in in-
jury to a person. 2 65 Under this standard, the court appears to have
applied a mens rea requirement that was very similar to that re-
quired by the definition of "recklessly" in the criminal code. 266 Sim-
ilarly, in Wheeler, the court of appeals specifically required proof
that the defendant satisfied the criminal code's definition of "reck-
lessly" as to the circumstance that his investment scheme constituted
a security.267
In contrast to the approach in Kimoktoak and Wheeler, the
court held in Rice that before a person could be convicted of trans-
porting illegally taken meat he must know or reasonably should
have known that the meat was taken illegally.268 The "reasonably
should have known" standard was inherently ambiguous for two
reasons. First, it did not specify whether the defendant must have
been subjectively aware of the risk that the meat was taken illegally,
or alternatively, whether liability could attach if he objectively
should have been aware of that risk.269 Second, regardless of
whether subjective awareness of the risk was required, the court did
not clarify whether the standard would be governed by the reason-
the actor's duty of due care, which is the 'duty to act with that amount of care which
a reasonably prudent person would use under same or similar circumstances.'" Id
at 1117-18 (quoting Leigh v. Lundquist, 540 P.2d 492, 494 (Alaska 1975)) (footnote
omitted).
264. 584 P.2d 25, 31 (Alaska 1978); see supra text accompanying note 108.
265. 584 P.2d at 32; see supra text accompanying note 118.
266. Applying the definition of "recklessly" in the criminal code, see supra text
accompanying note 256, to the circumstance of Kimoktoak's awareness that an acci-
dent involving injury resulted, the pertinent question would have been: Was
Kimoktoak aware of and did he consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that an accident involving injury had occurred? Kimoktoak's disregard of
that risk must also have involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a reasonable person would have observed in the situation.
267. 659 P.2d 1241, 1252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); see supra text accompanying
notes 204-05.
268. 626 P.2d 104, 108 (Alaska 1981); see supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
269. Contrast this ambiguity with the definitions of "recklessly," see supra text
accompanying note 256, and "criminal negligence," see infra text accompanying
note 282, in the criminal code. See also supra text accompanying note 262.
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able person test of civil negligence,270 or by a more serious deviation
from that standard as required by the definitions of "recklessly" and
"criminal negligence" in the criminal code.271
In Reynolds the court of appeals appeared to answer both ques-
tions when it equated the "reasonably should have known" test with
a civil negligence standard.272 Under this standard, a defendant ap-
parently "should have known" that a particular circumstance existed
if a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would have been
aware of the risk that the circumstance existed, regardless of whether
the defendant was subjectively aware of that risk. Any doubt that
this was how the court of appeals intended to apply the "reasonably
should have known" standard was removed in Gudjonnson v.
State.273 In Gudjonnson the court of appeals upheld the convictions
of two fishing skippers for taking undersized crabs based on evi-
dence presented at trial "that the skipper of a crab vessel knows or
reasonably should know when undersized crab are taken. ' 274 The
court of appeals did not consider, however, whether the defendants
were actually aware of the risk that the crabs were undersized. Simi-
larly, in Langesater v. State,275 the court of appeals held that before a
person can be convicted of fishing in an undersized boat the jury
must be instructed that he was "at the very least. . negligent in
failing to recognize that his boat" was underlength.276
At first glance, it might be concluded that the recognition of a
civil negligence standard in Reynolds, Gudjonnson, and Langesater
by the court of appeals is inconsistent with the supreme court's con-
demnation of a negligence standard as a constitutionally sufficient
degree of mens rea in Speidel.277 It should be recalled, however, that
in Speidel the court merely condemned the use of a negligence stan-
dard to impose liability for a felony offense. 278 In Kimoktoak and
Wheeler, the mens rea standard which was implied paralleled the
definition of "recklessly" in the criminal code and differed signifi-
270. See supra note 263 for the definition of "negligent" conduct applicable in
civil litigation.
271. Both the definitions of "recklessness" and "criminal negligence" require a
"gross deviation" from the standard of care or conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation and were "expressly formulated to preclude mere
civil negligence from forming the basis for a criminal conviction." Andrew, 653
P.2d at 1066; see supra text accompanying note 260.
272. 655 P.2d 1313, 1315-17 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); see supra text accompanying
notes 150-51.
273. 667 P.2d 1254 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
274. Id at 1256.
275. 668 P.2d 1359 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
276. Id at 1360 (emphasis added).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
278. See Langesater, 668 P.2d at 1360.
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cantly from a civil negligence standard. Both Kimokloak and
Wheeler, however, also involved felony prosecutions. In contrast,
Reynolds, Gudjonnson, and Langesater involved prosecutions for
misdemeanor fish and game regulations that may have been thought
of as strict liability offenses before Rice. 279 Consequently, while the
criminal code provides that recklessly is the minimum culpable
mental state requirement that can be judicially implied in a crime in
Title 11, the court of appeals has apparently recognized that a civil
negligence standard can be implied in misdemeanor fish and game
regulations that are silent as to mens rea.
C. Criminal Negligence as the Minimum Culpable Mental State
Requirement
Of the four culpable mental states used in the criminal code,280
criminal negligence is the easiest for the prosecution to establish.
Unlike the definitions of the culpable mental states of "intention-
ally," "knowingly," and "recklessly," the definition of "criminal neg-
ligence" does not require any subjective intent or awareness on the
part of the defendant. 281 The test for criminal negligence is purely
an objective standard and is based on the failure of the defendant to
perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk. A person acts with
criminal negligence
when the person fails to perbeive a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; the
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to per-
ceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person would observe in the situation.282
The circumstances in which criminal negligence will serve as an
adequate basis upon which to impose liability in the criminal code
are extremely limited. Only three crimes allow a conviction based
279. See supra text accompanying note 131; see also supra note 33.
280. See supra notes 231-32 for the definitions of "intentionally" and "know-
ingly," text accompanying note 256 for the definition of "recklessly," and infra text
accompanying note 282 for the definition of "criminal negligence."
281. A person acts with criminal negligence when he 'rails toperceive a substan-
tial and unjustifiable risk." ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(4) (1983) (emphasis ad-
ded). On the other hand, a person acts intentionally when "the person's conscious
objective is to cause" a particular result, id § 11.81.900(a)(1), knowingly when he
"is aware that the conduct is of [a particular] nature or that [a certain] circumstance
exists," id § 11.81.900(a)(2), and recklessly when he is "aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk." Id § 11.81.900(a)(3).
282. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(4) (1983). The definition of "criminal negli-
gence" in the criminal code is similar to the definition of the culpable mental state of
"negligently" in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962).
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on criminal negligence: criminally negligent homicide,283 criminally
negligent burning,284 and permitting an escape.285 Further, the cul-
pable mental state of criminal negligence can never be read into a
crime that fails to specify a culpable mental state.286 Nevertheless, in
the three crimes where criminal negligence is a sufficient culpable
mental state to sustain a conviction, a person will be held criminally
liable based on inadvertence.287 Whether the degree of inadvertence
required by the definition of criminal negligence distinguishes it
283. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.130(a) (1983) provides that "[a] person commits the
crime of criminally negligent homicide if, with criminal negligence, the person
causes the death of another person." The crime is a class C felony punishable by a
maximum term of imprisonment of five years. Id § 11.41.130(b); id § 12.55.125(e)
(Supp. 1983).
284. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.430(a) (1983) provides that "[a] person commits the
crime of criminally negligent burning if with criminal negligence the person dam-
ages property of another by fire or explosion." The crime is a class A misdemeanor
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of one year. Id § 11.46.430(b)
(1983); id § 12.55.135(a) (Supp. 1983).
285. ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.370(a) (1983) provides that a public servant commits
the crime of permitting an escape "if with criminal negligence the public servant
permits a person under official detention to escape." The crime is a class C felony
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. Id § 11.56.370(b);
id § 12.55.125(e) (Supp. 1983).
286. See supra note 255.
287. The commentary to the Model Penal Code sections on culpability summa-
rizes the debate over whether inadvertence should ever be the basis upon which to
impose criminal liability:
Of the four kinds of culpability defined, there is, of course, least to be said
for treating negligence as a sufficient basis for imposing criminal liability.
Since the actor is inadvertent by hypothesis, it has been argued that the
"threat of punishment for negligence must pass him by, because he does
not realize that it is addressed to him." So too it has been urged that edu-
cation or corrective treatment not punishment is the proper social method
of dealing with persons with inadequate awareness, since what is implied
is not a moral defect. We think, however, that this is to oversimplify the
issue. Knowledge that conviction and sentence, not to speak of punish-
ment, may follow conduct that inadvertently creates improper risk supplies
men with an additional motive to take care before acting, to use their fac-
ulties and draw on their experience in gauging the potentialities of contem-
plated conduct. To some extent, at least, this motive may promote
awareness and thus be effective as a measure of control. Certainly legisla-
tors act on this assumption in a host of situations and it seems to us dog-
matic to assert that they are wholly wrong. Accordingly, we think that
negligence, as here defined, cannot be wholly rejected as a ground of cul-
pability which may suffice for purposes of penal law, though we agree that
it should not be generally deemed sufficient in the definition of specific
crimes, and that it often will be right to differentiate such conduct for the
purposes of sentence.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment at 126-27 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (citations
omitted). See generally Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded From Penal
Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 632 (1963); Brady, Punishmentfor Negligence: .4 Reply
to Professor Hall, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 107 (1972).
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from the court's condemnation in Speidel of imposing criminal lia-
bility for a felony on the basis of negligent conduct288 must now be
considered.
With respect to the crime of criminally negligent homicide, the
culpable mental state of criminal negligence likely defines a constitu-
tionally sufficient level of intent. In OLeary v. State, 289 a case de-
cided before the effective date of the criminal code, the court
sustained a conviction under the former crime of negligent homicide
based on the culpable negligence of the defendant in operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated.290 The term culpable negligence
was not defined in the statute and the jury instruction given at trial
did not require a finding that the defendant was aware that his con-
duct created the risk of death.291 The instruction did, however, re-
quire the jury to find that the defendant's inadvertence exceeded the
level required by a civil negligence standard.2 92
In allowing a conviction to be based on inadvertence, but re-
quiring the degree of inadvertence to be greater than that required
for civil negligence, the court in OLeary approved a jury instruction
that is consistent with the definition of "criminal negligence" in the
criminal code.293 Further, while Speidel was not cited in OLeary, it
288. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59; see also State v. Campbell, 536
P.2d 105, 109 (Alaska 1975) (emphasizing that the statute in Speidel encompassed
"mere inadvertent or negligent conduct"); Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 680 (Alaska
1971) (emphasizing that the challenged statute in Speidel allowed conviction based
on a "simple negligent failure to act").
289. 604 P.2d 1099 (Alaska 1979).
290. ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.080 (repealed 1980) provided that "[e]very killing of
a human being by the culpable negligence of another, when the killing is not murder
in the first or second degree, or is not justifiable or excusable, is manslaughter, and
is punishable accordingly."
291. The instruction defined culpable negligence in the following manner:
Culpable negligence is something more than that slight degree of negligence
necessary to support a civil action for damages and is negligence of such a
degree, so gross and wanton, as to be deserving of punishment. Culpable
negligence implies a reckless disregard of the consequences which might
ensue from the doing of an act and constitutes conduct of such a reckless,
gross and wanton character so as to indicate an utter, heedless indifference
to the rights, properties, safety and even the lives of others ....
In order to constitute culpable negligence it is not necessary that the ac-
tor actually recognize that his conduct is extremely dangerous. It is enough
that he knows or has reason to know of circumstances which would bring
home to the realization of the ordinary, reasonable man the extremely
dangerous character of his conduct.
604 P.2d at 1104 (emphasis added).
292. Id at 1105.
293. The definition of "criminal negligence" requires a "gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." ALASKA
STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(4) (1983); see supra text accompanying note 282.
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can be concluded that by requiring a level of inadvertence greater
than that required by a civil negligence standard, the repealed crime
of negligent homicide,2 94 as well as the current crime of criminally
negligent homicide,295 satisfy the consciousness of wrongdoing re-
quirement of SpeideL296 Similarly, the use of the culpable mental
state of criminal negligence in the crimes of criminally negligent
burning and permitting an escape would also appear to satisfy the
primary concern of Speidel by preventing the imposition of criminal
liability for a felony based on a civil negligence standard.297
III. CONCLUSION
A comparison of the judicial and legislative approaches to mens
rea in Alaska reveals more significant similarities than differences.
The three important mens rea principles recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Morisseue,298 having been initially fol-
lowed by the Alaska Supreme Court, now find explicit recognition in
the criminal code. The judicial reluctance expressed in Campbell to
read a mens rea element into a statute which does not codify a com-
mon law crime 299 has been replaced by the Rice rule of construction
which requires a court to read a mens rea element into a crime unless
a contrary legislative intent clearly appears.3°° A similar rule ap-
pears in the criminal code.30' While strict liability or public welfare
offenses continue to exist in theory,302 there effectively is a legislative
and judicial presumption against their creation and recognition. 30 3
The court's condemnation in Speidel of imposing criminal lia-
bility for a felony based on a civil negligence standard 3 4 finds con-
firmation in the criminal code rules on culpable mental state
requirements. The minimum culpable mental state of criminal neg-
ligence is defined to insure that criminal liability cannot be imposed
based on a civil negligence standard.3 05 In practice the legislature
294. See supra note 290.
295. See supra note 283.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
297. Id Of course, the crime of criminally negligent burning is only a misde-
meanor. It is therefore likely that it does not even fall within the court's condemna-
tion in Speidel of imposing criminal liability for a felony based on inadvertence.
298. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
300. See supra text accompanying note 129.
301. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b) (1983); see supra note 237.
302. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b)(1)(B) (1983); see supra note 237; see also notes
33 & 46 and accompanying text.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31 & 236-49. But see supra note 154;
see also Nelson, discussed supra at notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 271.
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has been extremely reluctant to impose liability for criminal negli-
gence, no matter how seriously the degree of inadvertence has been
defined.3o6
Given the judicial and legislative consensus that civil negligence
should not provide the basis for the imposition of criminal sanctions,
it may seem somewhat surprising that in recent cases the court of
appeals has implied a civil negligence standard in misdemeanor fish
and game regulations that failed to specify any mens rea require-
ment.30 7 This level of mens rea would clearly be an inadequate form
of culpability for any offense in the criminal code and, under Spel-
del, for any felony outside the criminal code. Nevertheless, it is sub-
mitted that in Reynolds, Gudjonnson, and Langesater, the court of
appeals read an appropriate level of mens rea into the challenged
regulations. In each of the three cases the status of the offense as a
fish and game regulation may have justified its interpretation as a
strict liability offense prior to the adoption of the Rice rule of con-
struction.308 Today, the legislature could presumably eliminate any
mens rea requirement in these regulations by adopting a clear state-
ment of intent to impose strict liability.3°9 The court of appeals has
therefore taken a novel, but nevertheless justifiable, approach in ap-
plying a "half-way" standard of mens rea for these offenses, which
requires the prosecution to establish more than would be required if
the offense imposed strict liability, but less than would be required
under a criminal negligence standard.310
The one significant difference between the judicial and legisla-
tive approaches to mens rea which cannot be reconciled, however,
pertains to the continued judicial use of the phrase "consciousness of
wrongdoing" as a shorthand reference to the general mens rea re-
quirement. First used in Speidel, 3 1 the phrase ordinarily has noth-
306. See supra text accompanying notes 283-86.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 268-76.
308. See supra text accompanying note 131; see also supra note 33.
309. See supra text accompanying note 154. But see Rice, 626 P.2d at 116,
wherein Justice Matthews, in a concurring opinion, proposed a test whereby strict
liability could not be imposed for any crime for which imprisonment is authorized.
310. If there is no concept between mens rea in the conventional sense and
strict liability, then the agencies of enforcement will choose strict liability
when the pressure to do so exists, as it notably does in the case of offenses
that are handled on an assembly-line basis. But there is a "half-way
house": criminal liability predicated upon negligence. . . . [T]he idea of
criminal responsibility based upon the actor's failure to act as carefully as
he should affords an important and largely unutilized means for avoiding
the tyranny of strict liability in the criminal law.
Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 109-10 (1962)
(footnote omitted); see also G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 262
(2d ed. 1961).
311. Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 78 (Alaska 1969).
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ing to do with the issue of whether the defendant knew that his
conduct was wrong; nevertheless, it conveys precisely that require-
ment. It should not have been surprising, therefore, that less than
two years after Speidel, the defendant in Alex requested a jury in-
struction that "conduct cannot be criminal unless it is shown that the
one charged with criminal conduct had an awareness or conscious-
ness of wrongdoing. '312 In Alex the court upheld the trial court's
denial of this instruction,313 cautioned that "undue emphasis should
not be placed upon our use of the term 'wrongdoing' in [Speidel, ]"314
and observed that consciousness of wrongdoing does not require the
defendant to act with "a specific awareness of wrongfulness" but
only that the defendant's "intent be commensurate with the conduct
proscribed. '315 Having said that, it might have been expected that
the court would have abandoned use of the phrase consciousness of
wrongdoing. Unfortunately, that did not occur. Instead, in every
major case decided since Alex that has discussed mens rea require-
ments, the appellate courts have continued to use the phrase as a
shorthand reference to the general mens rea requirement. 316
Only in Hentzner was proof that the defendant knew that his
conduct was wrong even arguably relevant to the issue whether he
acted with the requisite mens rea. The holding in Hentzner, how-
ever, appears to have been based on the use of the mens rea term
willfully in the challenged statute and some sparse authority recog-
nizing that a willful violation of the securities law requires proof of
an actual awareness of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant.317
Thus, for two reasons Hentzner is of limited authority. First, even
the narrowest holding suggested by the opinion, that the crime of
willfully selling or offering to sell an unregistered security requires
proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was wrong,318 is of
questionable authority after Wheeler. 3 19 Second, no crime in the
criminal code is defined to require proof of willful conduct.
312. Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 680 (Alaska 1971); see supra text accompanying
note 65.
313. 484 P.2d at 682; see supra text accompanying note 74.
314. 484 P.2d at 681; see supra text accompanying note 68.
315. 484 P.2d at 681; see supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
316. See, e.g., State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 107 (Alaska 1981) (quoting State v.
Guest, 536 P.2d 836, 838 (Alaska 1978) (quoting Speidel, 460 P.2d at 78)); Hentzner
v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 825 (Alaska 1980) (quoting Speidel, 460 P.2d at 78));
Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 29 (Alaska 1978) (citing Speide, 460 P.2d at 78);
State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 108 (Alaska 1975) (quoting Speidel, 460 P.2d at 78);
Reynolds v. State, 655 P.2d 1313, 1314 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam) (citing
Speidel, 460 P.2d at 78).
317. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 179-80.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 207-22.
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Hentzner, therefore, will be of no assistance in applying the four cul-
pable mental states used in the criminal code.
The consciousness of wrongdoing formulation is simply irrele-
vant to the issue whether the defendant acts with the necessary cul-
pable mental state to establish a crime in the criminal code. For
example, a person commits criminally negligent homicide if he
causes death through criminal negligence.320 There is no require-
ment that the defendant know that what he is doing is wrong. In-
deed, even the defendant's awareness that his conduct creates a risk
of death is irrelevant to whether he acts with criminal negligence.321
Supporters of the consciousness of wrongdoing formulation
might reply that in Hentzner the court clarified the phrase by stating
that it does not require proof of an actual awareness of wrongdoing
for malum in se crimes.322 It might therefore be argued that the leg-
islative and judicial approaches are in agreement that an actual
awareness of wrongdoing is irrelevant for most crimes. This argu-
ment, however, only serves to emphasize the misleading nature of
the phrase consciousness of wrongdoing. Virtually every crime in
the criminal code falls within the malum in se category. 323 Since the
court has emphasized that the phrase consciousness of wrongdoing
does not mean what it appears to say when it is applied to malum in
se crimes, the preferable approach is to abandon the use of that
phrase when its plain meaning is inapplicable to the overwhelming
majority of crimes in the criminal code.
Abandonment of the consciousness of wrongdoing formulation
would not leave the legislature or judiciary powerless to add or to
imply a specific mens rea element in a crime which requires proof
that the defendant knew that his conduct was wrong. Indeed, several
crimes in the criminal code specifically require proof that the de-
fendant knew that his conduct was improper.324 Moreover, crimes
320. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.130 (1983); see supra note 283.
321. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(4) (1983); see supra text accompanying note
262.
322. See supra text accompanying note 174.
323. The court of appeals recently recognized the possibility that the crime of
prostitution, ALASKA STAT. § 11.66.100 (1983), may be a malum prohibitum crime.
Bell v. State, 668 P.2d 829, 834 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (howeverpromoting prosti-
tution is a malum in se offense). It is difficult to select another crime in the criminal
code that falls within the court's definition ofmalumprohibitum crimes although it is
possible that some of the gambling offenses might fall within that definition. See
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.66.200-.260 (1983).
324. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.330 (1983) provides that "[a] person commits the
crime of custodial interference in the second degree if,. . . knowing that the person
has no legal right to do so," he takes a child from its lawful custodian. (emphasis
added). See also id § 11.41.320 (custodial interference in the first degree); id
§§ 11.41.480-.486 (providing that the crime of criminal mischief occurs if the de-
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defined outside the criminal code could continue to be interpreted to
require an actual awareness of wrongdoing based on the particular
mens rea term used or the presence of a legislative intent to impose
that requirement.
Fifty years ago, Professor Sayre, in discussing the ambiguity in-
herent in the phrase mens rea, concluded that "[tihere is only one
way out. Either the term must be discarded altogether, or its scope
must be carefully defined. 32 5 In the fifteen years that have passed
since Speidel, Alaska appellate courts have struggled to clarify the
consciousness of wrongdoing requirement. Judged by the continu-
ing volume of litigation in the area and the ambiguities inherent in
the recent Hentzner and Wheeler decisions, those attempts have
largely been unsuccessful. Rather than continue in an effort to clar-
ify this inherently misleading and ambiguous phrase, the Alaska ap-
pellate courts should abandon the consciousness of wrongdoing
formulation and replace it with the following suggested formulation
of the mens rea requirement:
Ordinarily, a person may not be convicted of a crime
unless that person acts with a degree of fault which is
greater than that required by a civil negligence standard. 326
There are two exceptions to this rule. First, the fault re-
quirement can be eliminated if the crime is a public welfare
offense and there is a clear expression of legislative intent
to impose liability regardless of fault.327 Second, an excep-
tion applies to misdemeanors outside the criminal code that
have traditionally been classified as public welfare offenses.
In the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent to
impose liability regardless of fault, the minimum fault re-
quirement for these crimes is civil negligence.328
Proof that the person knew that his conduct was wrong
is irrelevant in determining whether the fault requirement
has been satisfied 329 with two exceptions. Under the first,
proof that the person knew that his conduct was wrong is
fendant has no "reasonable ground to believe [he] has" a right to tamper or interfere
with property belonging to another).
325. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REV. 974, 1025 (1932).
326. Speidel, 460 P.2d at 80-81; see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
327. Morissetle, 342 U.S. at 252-60passim; see supra note 33; Rice v. State, 626
P.2d at 104, 108 (Alaska 1981); supra text accompanying note 129; Speidel, 460 P.2d
at 79, supra note 46; ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b)(1)(B)-(b)(2) (1983); supra text
accompanying notes 237-49.
328. See supra notes 307-10 and accompanying text. If the imposition of a negli-
gence standard would make the criminal statute unenforceable, liability without
fault may be imposed. See supra note 134.
329. Alex, 484 P.2d at 681-82; see supra text accompanying notes 69-72 & 76-77.
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required if the crime imposes liability for the failure to act
under circumstances where nothing places the person on
notice regarding the duty to act.330 Under the second, the
legislature may define a crime to specifically require proof
that the person knew that his conduct was wrong.331
While this proposed rule lacks the conciseness inherent in the
consciousness of wrongdoing formulation, it substitutes accuracy for
brevity. The adoption of this rule by the Alaska appellate courts and
the abandonment of the consciousness of wrongdoing formulation
will clarify prior judicial rules on mens rea requirements, insure con-
sistency between the legislative and judicial approaches to mens rea,
and perhaps reduce the inordinate amount of litigation that has
arisen concerning the meaning of the phrase consciousness of
wrongdoing.
330. See supra note 186.
331. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 324.
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